Yulia Tymoshenko: Mad hot or just mad and hot?

Like many Americans, I have a natural weakness for female activists and politicians in Warsaw Pact countries. There is something about a Slavic nationalist damsel being threaten the Russian Federation that brings out the righteous American "knight in shining armor" in me. I can't explain it.

One such damsel I've been watching closely is the beautiful, but controversial former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Before entering politics in the mid-1990s, Mrs. Tymoshenko served as president of United Energy Systems of Ukraine, an energy company parceled off from the Soviet-Era Ukrainian Oil Company that most served as a middle-man for Russian oil and gas. She rose to prominence by backing Viktor Yushchenko during the 2004 Orange Revolution. When Yushchenko handily trounced his Kremlin-backed opponent Viktor Yanukovych December 2004 presidential run-off, he appointed her to be his first prime minister. She held the office for about nine months before her parliamentary coalition fell apart and she was dismissed.

What makes Mrs. Tymoshenko so controversial? Michael Averko over at the RussiaBlog characterizes the common criticism my Ukrainian friends give me:

Ukrainian-American acquaintance of mine recently likened Ukrainian political figure Yulia Tymoshenko to a Stalinist because the name of her party (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc) has a cult of personality aspect. I nevertheless shy away from the loaded Stalinist label. Outside of North Korea's Kim Jong Il, I'm hard pressed to find a present day world leader who comes close to matching the Soviet dictator. Even Kim Jong Il falls well short of the ruthless standard set by “Uncle Joe.”

Politics is a business. Corporations are often named after their respective founders. For this reason, it's somewhat surprising to see so few political parties (the world over) named after the party leader. Like her or not, Tymoshenko has that charismatic touch.

[snip]

I compare Tymoshenko to the late Slobodan Milosevic, because at one time or another, both leaders utilized Communist, pragmatist and nationalist positions for purely opportunistic reasons (on the Stalin label, Chicago Governor Rob Blagojevich erroneously linked Milosevic to Stalin). Whereas other politicians show a greater sincerity to a given ideology, the Tymoshenkos and Milosevics move in whatever direction they see fit for acquiring and maintaining power.

In the last few years, Tymoshenko has been described by some political observers as a Ukrainian nationalist. The Galician region of western Ukraine is a hot bed of a Ukrainian nationalism that favors separating Ukraine from Russia as much as possible. My disagreements with the Galician Ukrainian nationalist vision simultaneously recognizes that this point of view springs from true believers. Galicia's overall numbers in Ukraine limit its clout. This is made up in part by some zealous activists in that region, combined with its relatively large and passionate lobbying diaspora in the West. North America's image of Ukraine is greatly shaped by the transplanted Galician perspective. One which is disproportionate to the overall pro-Russian stance found in Ukraine itself.

This image of Mrs. Tymoshenko is only her vitriolic article in the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs entitled Containing Russia. The bulk this article is behind a subscription wall, but I bet the Council on Foreign Relations won't mind if I reproduce a few of the juicier bits of her diatribe:

Sixty-one years ago, a telegram arrived at the State Department from the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Its purpose was to examine the sources of the conduct of the men who ruled in the Kremlin. Its impact was immediate. The "Long Telegram," penned by a young diplomat named George Kennan, became the basis for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union for the next half century.

Although the Soviet Union is long gone, the West is once again groping to understand what motivates the leaders in the Kremlin. Many believe that the principles behind Kennan's policy of "containment" are still applicable today -- and see a new Cold War, this time against Vladimir Putin's resurgent Russia, in the offing.

I do not believe that a new Cold War is under way or likely. Nevertheless, because Russia has indeed transformed itself since Putin became president in 2000, the problem of fitting Russia into the world's diplomatic and economic structures (particularly when it comes to markets for energy) raises profound questions. Those questions are all the more vexing because Russia is usually judged on the basis of speculation about its intentions rather than on the basis of its actions.

[snip]

Russia's foreign policy has been equally troubling. Moscow has given Iran diplomatic protection for its nuclear ambitions, and Russian arms sales are promiscuous. The Kremlin has consistently harassed neighboring countries; former Soviet nations, such as Georgia, have faced near economic strangulation. In February, Putin spoke favorably about creating a "gas OPEC."

None of this should be surprising, for Putin's aim has been unvarying from the start of his presidency: restore Russian greatness. Unlike Boris Yeltsin, who accepted dissent as a necessary part of democratic politics -- it was, after all, as a dissenter from Mikhail Gorbachev's rule that he gained the presidency of Russia -- Putin was determined from the outset to curtail political opposition as an essential step toward revitalizing centralized power. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, of Yukos Oil, for example, is in prison for daring to challenge the Kremlin's authority and perhaps aspiring to succeed Putin. Order, power (including the power to divide the spoils of Russia's natural-resource wealth), and reviving Russia's international influence, not democracy or human rights, are what matter in today's Kremlin.

The backgrounds of the people who make up Putin's government have something to do with this orientation. A study of 1,016 leading figures in Putin's regime -- departmental heads of the president's administration, cabinet members, parliamentary deputies, heads of federal units, and heads of regional executive and legislative branches -- conducted by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of Moscow's Center for the Study of Elites, found that 26 percent at some point served in the KGB or one of its successor agencies. Kryshtanovskaya argues that a closer look at these biographies -- examining gaps in resumés, odd career paths, or service in KGB affiliates -- suggests that 78 percent of the top people in Putin's regime can be considered ex-KGB. (The significance of such findings should not be exaggerated: former secret police may hold many of Russia's highest offices, but Russia is not a police state.)

[snip]

As a convinced European, I support Germany and the EU in this effort. Relations with Russia are too vital to the security and prosperity of all of us to be developed individually and ad hoc. If there is one country toward which Europeans -- and, indeed, the entire West -- should share a common foreign policy, it is Russia. With high world energy prices allowing Russia to emerge from the trauma of its postcommunist transition, now is the time for a clear-sighted reckoning of European security in the face of Russia's renewed power. Relying on Russia's long-term systemic problems to curb its pressure tactics will not prevent the Kremlin from reestablishing its hegemony in the short run.

The article is clearly designed to hit all of today's hot button issues with Russia: the (show) trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a government run by the chekisti, the recent spate of thinly-veiled pipeline and production politics involving the energy giant Gasprom, Russian involvement in the breakaway provinces Abkhazia, South Ossetia (both in Georgia), Transnistria (Moldova), Nagorno-Karabak (Azerbaijian) and Crimea (Ukraine) -- she even throws in this great reference to the appeasement of Hitler to boot:

Unfortunately, political leaders usually have the least idea of what to do when the scope for action is greatest. By the time they have a better idea, the moment for decisive and effective action may have passed. In the 1930s, for example, the French and British governments were too unsure of Hitler's objectives to act. But their obsession with Hitler's motives was utterly misguided. Realpolitik should have taught them that Germany's relations with its neighbors would be determined by relative power, not German intentions alone. A large and strong Germany bordered to the east by small and weak states would have been a threat no matter who ruled in Berlin. The Western powers should thus have spent less time assessing Hitler's motives and more time counterbalancing Germany's strength. Once Germany rearmed, Hitler's real intentions would be irrelevant. This was Winston Churchill's message throughout his "wilderness years." But instead of heeding Churchill, the British and the French continued to treat Hitler as a psychological problem, not a strategic danger -- until it was too late. What matters in diplomacy is power, not the state of mind of those who wield it.

I think Churchill would be pleased to find out that everyone remembers his foresight in 1936, but easily forgets how he ordered the invasion of the Dardanelles that culminated in the disastrous Battle of Gallipoli. The diggers of ANZACs certainly remember. Hasn't anyone seen the movie? It was like one of Mel Gibson's first movies -- came out right between Mad Max and the Road Warrior.

Reverse Oil Weapon?

There was a great article in the December 26, 2006 edition of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by Roger Stern that has largely flown under the political radar in Washington. Using open-source, non-Farsi materials on the Iranian oil industry, Stern explores Iran's argument for developing nuclear power in the face of its vast oil resources. His thesis is that the declining productivity of Iran's state-controlled oil industry and the exploding costs of domestic energy subsidies will cause its oil exports to completely evaporate somewhere between 2012 and 2022. Iran, therefore, does has a significant interest in pursuing nuclear energy to stave off this inevitable economic crisis in Tehran.

The report is short, but pretty wonky. Stern's math is pretty solid and his case is fairly convincing given how badly the Ahmadinejad administration has bungled oil politics in Tehran over the past year and a half. The article's only weakness is that it assumes that the Iranian government won't make the difficult choice of cutting domestic fuel subsidies when push comes to shove on the budget. Analysts said the same thing about Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration back in 2005, but he managed to cut his country's substantial fuel subsidies twice without too much trouble.

That being said, the most intriguing part of the article, however, is the author's musings an American 'oil attack' on Iran:

Iran's petroleum crisis is a strategic opportunity. Unless price increases, export erosion seems likely to reduce the regime's monopoly rent stream. Such a dynamic seems propitious for some policy to compound the regime's self-inflicted problems. A nonviolent, economic attack on monopoly price is such a policy.

A price attack implies measures that would erode market power and hence reduce price. Market power exerted through OPEC investment restraint is responsible for most of the difference between the $4- to $10-per-barrel competitive price and market price, which has been much higher for most of the past 33 years. This difference underwrites the Islamic Republic, the need for U.S. force projection in the Gulf, and many other security problems (4). An analogous target in a military campaign would be an adversary's industrial capacity. Market power should be understood in this way, as inseparable from the threats it underwrites but also more vulnerable.

A price attack implies forced adoption of fuel-efficient technology by importing states. The resulting fuel efficiency (f-e) improvement would have to reduce demand by enough to force cartel producers to defend price, which they would do by reducing supply. Equitable sharing of supply cuts is an inherent problem for any cartel that lacks an enforcement mechanism for market sharing agreements.

[snip]

The most efficient policies to force f-e would be fuel taxation, cap and trade mechanisms (for horsepower, emissions, or miles traveled), or fleet f-e standards. Given what appears to be a decreasing price elasticity of gasoline demand in the U.S., some combination of standards and taxation might be most successful. The burden of new taxation could be partially offset by reductions to payroll or other taxes. Although the optimal price attack policy cannot be known, present U.S. energy policy is nonoptimal in that it ignores price. Energy policy has been adopted in response to the imaginary problem of oil dependence (4), which has reduced it to a quest for tax preferences by domestic producers.

Whatever policy might be adopted to mount a price attack, light-duty vehicles (LDVs) would be the source of most demand reductions because they are the least efficient among all oil-demand technologies. Unfortunately, Americans are not savers, new car consumers least of all. Indeed, car consumers may discount f-e savings almost to zero. Yet, although f-e may be unattractive to consumers, a policy to force adoption would be akin to a mandatory savings plan like social security but with higher returns.

I think this is the first time that someone has ever explicitly tied energy conservation together with foreign policy and national security. I don't know if the federal government could change conversation policy rapidly enough to impact Tehran, while at the same time minimizing its impact on U.S. economy. One thing's for sure though, this conservation-foreign policy link is definitely a lot more rational than the old "energy independence" meme.

This kind of puts those over-the-top "driving SUVs supports terrorism" commercials made by Americans for Fuel Efficient Cars in a whole new context though.

Translation: North Korea says uranium deal with Russia contigent on their support in the Six Party talks

This article from the Chunichi Shimbun is a bit old, but it is what started me on this translation idea. Jane over at the ACW originally picked up on it as it was reported on in an IHT article on the same subject. The translation is as follows: North Korea on negotiations of uranium deal with Russia: Supply is contingent on Six Party talks support December 3, 2006

North Korea made it clear on December 2nd that Russian plans to expand its enrichment industry by importing North Korean uranium ore are dependent on the condition that Russia support the North's position in the Six Party talks. Russian government sources have confirmed this to this paper. According to these same officials, Russian wants monopolistic import rights on uranium ore mined from sites at Pakchon and Sunchon, which are near the North Korean capital Pyongyang. The uranium would be enriched inside Russia with the aim of selling it for large sums of money as fuel for Russian-made nuclear power plants in China and Vietnam. Russia and North Korea have been in secret negotiations over this deal since 2002. Recently, the North Korean side has been positive about their prospects because they have tied opposition to the condition of an import monopoly on uranium ore to an understanding that Russia would advocate on their behalf at the Six Party talks in China and meet Pyongyang's desire for protection. On the one hand, the North Korean nuclear test was greated by a United Nations sanction resolution adopted in October, which affirmed steps towards an embargo on North Korean weapons of mass destruction and missile-related goods. To this end, Russia fears that the guarantees on peaceful use that are needed for imported North Korean uranium ore will be too complicated for their plans. Russia's current economic growth will continue to be fuelled by its exports of natural gas and crude oil, but its plans to expand its international influence in the nuclear fuel market by expanding its uranium enrichment industry. These problems have also occured regarding Iran's nuclear program, where Russia is supporting the construction of nuclear reactors in Bushehr that it will fuel, but it is also discretely taking up support for a UN sanctions resolution.

The last paragraph is a bit of a rush job, but I think the readers will get the picture. It definitely lines up with the fact that Russia is renationalizing its civilian nuclear industry and is working to build up its low-enriched uranium exports.

Return to Mogadishu and the Japan-Iran connection

The only thing surprising about Ethiopia's campaign to unseat the Islamic Courts Union and install the Transition Federal Government of Somalia is how rapid their advance to Mogadishu has been. I'm pretty surprised that the ICU forces have continued to use the tactics of a conventional army so late into the conflict. It probably would have been smarter for Somali Islamists to have switched to dispersed geurrilla tactics after Ethopian troops crossed the border in serious numbers to reinforce Baidoa back on December 8th. The ICU is just too poorly armed to successfully use conventional tactics against the relatively well-heeled Ethiopian military. As the last paragraphs of the article on the conflict from today's Post suggests:

Witnesses reported seeing a large number of foreign fighters in the convoys heading south. Islamic movement leaders had called on foreign Muslims to join their "holy war" against Ethiopia, which has a majority Christian population. Hundreds were believed to have answered the call. Residents told the AP that Islamic leader Hassan Dahir Aweys had arrived in the frontline town of Jilib, 65 miles north of Kismayo, earlier Thursday with hundreds of fighters aboard 45 pickup trucks mounted with anti-aircraft guns. Islamic fighters have gone door to door in Kismayo recruiting children as young as 12 to make a last stand on behalf of the Islamic movement, according to a U.N. report citing the families of boys taken to Jilib.

Pressing local children into service is an act of desparate act of a group looking towards martyrdom, not one preparing for an insurgency. Did they learn nothing from the defeat and subsequent rebirth of the Taliban in Afghanistan? Massing militiamen just creates larger targets for Ethiopia's Russian-made attack helicopters. For those interested in the Japanese angle on the current flap over Iran's nuclear program, I would definitely suggest giving Michael Penn's "Oil and Power: The Rise and Fall of the Japan-Iran Partnership in Azadegan" a read. Its a quick read covering Japan's involvement in the exploration of Iran's Azadagen oil field and it provides a solid description of how Japan was caught between the bellicose stubbornness of the Bush and Ahmadinejad administrations. Thankfully the Japanese managed to back away from their investments without incurring huge losses, but things did get interesting - at one point the Iranians suggested the Japanese provide technical cooperation to the Iranian nuclear program as a way ensuring it is peaceful.