Hear that? Its the sound of norm disintegration...

Back in April, I remember hearing rumors around the water cooler that the Israelis were lobbying the Nuclear Suppliers Group for a 'Bush-Singh' type of nuclear trade agreement. At the time, I wasn't able to uncover any news items to confirm such talk, so I dismissed it as Pentagon gossip.

Well, it appears that the rumors were true. According to a piece in today's Post, Israel did lobby the NSG back in March and they are now taking a proposal to Capitol Hill:

The Israeli presentation, made in a "nonpaper" that allows for official deniability, was offered in the context of the NSG's debate over India's bid for an exemption, according to a March 17 letter by the NSG's chairman. Among the nations that have not signed the treaty, only India and Israel would qualify for admission to the NSG under the Israeli proposal.

David Siegel, spokesman for the Israeli Embassy, said it would be "grossly inaccurate" to suggest that Israel is demanding an exemption or linking its efforts to any other issue, such as the India debate.

"Israel has never asked the NSG for any exemption to its nuclear supply guidelines, nor has Israel made any Israeli-specific request of the NSG," Siegel said. "Israel, recognized to be a full-fledged adherent to the NSG guidelines, has urged the NSG to consider adopting a generic, multi-tiered, criteria-based approach towards nuclear technology transfers." He noted that some NSG countries previously have suggested such an approach.

"Modification of the NSG guidelines, were it to take place along the lines proposed by Israel, would considerably enhance the nuclear nonproliferation regime," Siegel said.

The Israeli plan offers 12 criteria for allowing nuclear trade with non-treaty states, including one that hints at Israel's status as an undeclared nuclear weapons state: A state should be allowed to engage in nuclear trade if it applies "stringent physical protection, control and accountancy measures to all nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities, source material and special nuclear material in its territory."

If you look at the tenor of Bush administration nonproliferation policy, they should be inclined to agree with such a proposal. Prior to 2000, nonproliferation was about keeping the declared and undeclared portions of the nuclear weapons club as small as possible. Now, nonproliferation is about keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of 'tyrants' and 'terrorists.'

While I would be the last one to advocate for giving a 'tyrant' or a 'terrorist' a nuclear weapon, I would like to point out two flaws in the White House's logic: (1) What exactly are the criteria for applying either label to a nation or group? (2) How do plan on convincing all states with relatively mature nuclear industries to sign up to those definitions?

Right now, the answer to the first question looks a lot like 'those nations or groups who oppose U.S. foreign policy.' If the administration has an answer for the second question, I sincerely hope it does not have the word 'followership' in it. It wouldn't surprise me if it had the word 'U.S. sanctions' in it though.

Fortunately, I think the Bush administration will keep its distance from the Israeli proposal for fear of doing harm to their India deal. This is probably also why we are hearing about Israeli activity on Capitol Hill. If the White House was really receptive to the proposal, the first time we would have heard about it is when a final agreement was ready for signature.

I had never thought I would say this...

I'd like to extend my most sincere thanks for the Communist Party of India. A few days ago, CPI's leadership threatened to pull out of the Congress Party's ruling coalition if Prime Minister Manmohan Singh continued to pursue its nuclear deal with the U.S.

Indian leftists have traditionally served as a main driver of India's policy of non-alignment. Even though it has made them increasingly unpopular with the Indian public, leftists are sticking to their guns.

Since Monday, CPI has softened its position some and agreed to form a review panel to re-examine India's nuclear independence in terms of the extremely deferential 123 Agreement that has taken shape over the last few months. This may provide them with some cover to abandon their position, but it will at least stay the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime's death sentence a little longer.

Before I get a few e-mails excusing me of being 'backward' or a 'China-lover,' I will explain my thinking. If both PM Singh and President Bush think that their nuclear deal will create an opening for a U.S.-India partnership, they are selling an illusion.

The Indian public overwhelmingly supports the deal because they believe the NPT regime is unjust. They also believe that many U.S. policies are equally unjust and offer only tepid support for a strategic partnership that goes beyond nuclear cooperation. The CPI should receive credit for recognizing this fact and approaching the Bush-Singh deal with suspicion.

Romney/Obama Foreign Affairs essay roundup

The much talked-about July/August issue of Foreign Affairs arrived in the mail yesterday. It features essays on foreign policy from 2008 presidential candidates Barak Obama and Mitt Romney.

Both essays were pretty weak, but Romney's was just atrocious. If there is one reason for you to vote against him, let it be the contradiction between his description of the "defining challenge of our generation":

In the current conflict, the balance of forces is not nearly as close as during the early days of World War II and at critical points during the Cold War. There is no comparison between the economic, diplomatic, technological, and military resources of the civilized world today and those of the terrorist organizations and states that threaten it. Perhaps most important is the incredible resourcefulness of the American people and their unmatched education, inventiveness, and dedication. But today's threats are fundamentally different from those we grew used to confronting during World War II and the Cold War. Our enemies now have sleeper cells rather than armies. They use indiscriminate terror rather than tanks. Their soldiers -- as well as their victims -- include children. They count radical clergy among their generals. They communicate via the Internet. They recruit in schools, houses of worship, and prisons. They pursue nuclear weapons not as a strategic deterrent but as an offensive tool of terror.

And his first policy prescription:

The Bush administration has proposed an increase in defense spending for next year. This is an important first step, but we are going to need at least an additional $30-$40 billion annually over the next several years to modernize our military, fill gaps in troop levels, ease the strain on our National Guard and Reserves, and support our wounded soldiers. Looking at military spending over time as a percentage of GDP provides an interesting perspective. During World War II, the United States made huge sacrifices, investing more than a third of its economic activity to fight the war. As we confronted different enemies, such as those in Korea, our investment in defense responded accordingly. Since then, slowly but surely, it has decreased significantly. Through the buildup under President Reagan, it reached six percent of GDP in 1986 and helped turn the tide against the Soviet Union. Yet during the Clinton years, defense spending was dangerously reduced. More recently, although spending has increased, less than four percent of our GDP has been devoted to baseline defense spending. These ebbs and flows stemming from political dynamics have increased the costs and the uncertainty of our military preparedness.

The next president should commit to spending a minimum of four percent of GDP on national defense. Increased spending should not mean increased waste, however. A team of private-sector leaders and defense experts should carry out a stem-to-stern analysis of military purchasing. Accounts need to be thoroughly scrutinized to eliminate excessive contractor and supplier charges and prevent deals for equipment and programs that do more for politicians' popularity in their home districts than for the nation's protection. Congress needs to set stricter lobbying rules and keep a far more watchful eye on self-serving politicians, current and past, in regard to these matters.

So even though we completely outmatch the terrorists in resources and ingenuity, we have to grossly outspend them as well? I'd also like to see him try to enforce fiscal discipline on the military and the Congress. Let it be known that fighting the defense establishment can hazardous to the health of your SecDef. The rest of the essay is pretty incoherent and clearly demonstrates that he no grasp on why the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 actually worked when other attempts at bureaucratic reform didn't.

Obama's essay was a little better, but it felt pretty light on substance. He spends a good deal of the essay invoking the leadership of Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy, but never really defines himself as a leader. The bulk of the essay consists of paeans to fashionable Democratic foreign policy causes with no clear sense of policy priority. The most developed portion of the essay was on nuclear nonproliferation, which shouldn't be surprising considering that Obama has been under Sen. Dick Lugar's tutelage in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the last three years:

As president, I will work with other nations to secure, destroy, and stop the spread of these weapons in order to dramatically reduce the nuclear dangers for our nation and the world. America must lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years -- the most effective way to prevent terrorists from acquiring a bomb.

This will require the active cooperation of Russia. Although we must not shy away from pushing for more democracy and accountability in Russia, we must work with the country in areas of common interest -- above all, in making sure that nuclear weapons and material are secure. We must also work with Russia to update and scale back our dangerously outdated Cold War nuclear postures and de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons. America must not rush to produce a new generation of nuclear warheads. And we should take advantage of recent technological advances to build bipartisan consensus behind ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All of this can be done while maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. These steps will ultimately strengthen, not weaken, our security.

As we lock down existing nuclear stockpiles, I will work to negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material. We must also stop the spread of nuclear weapons technology and ensure that countries cannot build -- or come to the brink of building -- a weapons program under the auspices of developing peaceful nuclear power. That is why my administration will immediately provide $50 million to jump-start the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency-controlled nuclear fuel bank and work to update the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We must also fully implement the law Senator Richard Lugar and I passed to help the United States and our allies detect and stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world.

Finally, we must develop a strong international coalition to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Iran and North Korea could trigger regional arms races, creating dangerous nuclear flashpoints in the Middle East and East Asia. In confronting these threats, I will not take the military option off the table. But our first measure must be sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy -- the kind that the Bush administration has been unable and unwilling to use.

As I read it, Obama is interested in the CTBT, the Fissban treaty, an international nuclear fuel bank, cooperative threat reduction. He also poop-poos the rush to field the RRW and says diplomacy would be the core of his nonproliferation policy to Iran and North Korea. Can't say I disagree when any of that.

It is March 1940 all over again

According to New York Times's David Sanger and Thom Shanker, the U.S. strategy has travelled back in time to March 1940:

WASHINGTON, May 7 — Every week, a group of experts from agencies around the government — including the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the F.B.I. and the Energy Department — meet to assess Washington’s progress toward solving a grim problem: if a terrorist set off a nuclear bomb in an American city, could the United States determine who detonated it and who provided the nuclear material?

That uncertainty lies at the center of a vigorous, but carefully cloaked, debate within the Bush administration. It focuses on how to refashion the American approach to nuclear deterrence in an attempt to counter the threat posed by terrorists who could obtain bomb-grade uranium or plutonium to make and deliver a weapon.

A previously undisclosed meeting last year of President Bush’s most senior national security advisers was the highest level discussion about how to rewrite the cold war rules. The existing approach to deterrence dates from the time when the nuclear attacks Washington worried about would be launched by missiles and bombers, which can be tracked back to a source by radar, and not carried in backpacks or hidden in cargo containers.

Among the subjects of the meeting last year was whether to issue a warning to all countries around the world that if a nuclear weapon was detonated on American soil and was traced back to any nation’s stockpiles, through nuclear forensics, the United States would hold that country “fully responsible” for the consequences of the explosion. The term “fully responsible” was left deliberately vague so that it would be unclear whether the United States would respond with a retaliatory nuclear attack, or, far more likely, a nonnuclear retaliation, whether military or diplomatic.

History Lesson

For those who were not history majors in college, the idea of nuclear deterrence was first outlined in a March 1940 memorandum written by Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls. The original intent of this memorandum was two refute the fissile mass calculations made by Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard in the August 1939 letter they sent to President Roosevelt. Einstein and Szliard had originally asserted that an atomic bomb would require "large mass of uranium" that could be "...carried by boat and exploded in a port..." but "...might very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by air."

Frisch and Peierls argued that an atomic super bomb as small as 1-5 kilograms would release an explosive force the equivalent of 500-1000 tons of dynamite. They even roughly sketched out what would become gun-type explosive device design first used to build Little Boy. Besides the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Frisch-Peierls memorandum is also famous for the following paragraph:

If one works on the assumption that Germany is, or will be, in the possession of this weapon, it must be realized that no shelters are available that would be effective and that could be used on a large scale. The most effective reply would be a counter-threat with a similar bomb. Therefore it seems to us important to start production as soon and as rapidly as possible, even if it is not intended to use the bomb as a means of attack. Since the separation of the necessary amount of uranium is, in the most favourable circumstances, a matter of several months, it would obviously be too late to start production when such a bomb is known to be in the hands of Germany, and the matter seems, therefore, very urgent.

This thinking would lead to Eisenhower's New Look strategy with its attendant doctrine of massive retaliation first outlined in NSC 162/2. Kennedy replaced massive retaliation with a doctrine of flexible response, which pretty much survived until the end of the Cold War -- despite the occasional debate over counterforce targeting, decapitation strikes, and fail-deadly strategies. Now that the Cold War is over and the U.S. and Russia have reigned in from the brink of precipice, the threat of loose nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism has come to the forefront.

Rewinding the Clock

This Times piece suggests that U.S. strategy against nuclear terrorism is again somewhere between 1940 and 1953 -- scrambling to come up with a way to reliably cope with the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is not surprising that the notoriously pessimistic and lazy Bush administration would look to the well-worn idea of nuclear deterrence as a solution. The problem is that nuclear deterrence is an incredibly abstract concept that is only be applicable in a narrow set of conditions, many of which would not be true in a nuclear terrorism scenario.

Instead of going through all of the major issues, I would like to highlight three that the Bush administration will have tackle before forging the 'New New Look':

1. The decoupling of 'owner' and 'end user' -- Traditional nuclear deterrence is such a simple and universally-applicable concept because the 'owner' and 'end-user' of a nuclear weapons threat is always the same adversary. Nuclear terrorism deterrence must involve a two-level strategy that deters owners from intentionally transferring nuclear weapons, as well as deter the potential for end-user acquisition of nuclear weapons against the will of the owner. This will be especially difficult because the owner and end-user will probably have radically different centers of gravity and vulnerabilities. At the very least, the Bush administration has to solve the problem of targeting a non-state actor guilty of nuclear terrorism within an unwilling (and innocent) host state.

2. Marshaling the resources -- An incident of nuclear terrorism in the United States would undoubtedly have an enormous impact on the American people and the economy. Unlike traditional nuclear deterrence, however, it would not spell the end of the United States as a nation, nor is it as tangibly imminent as thousands of Soviet ICBMs standing ready on a continuous alert. How much will employing a nuclear terrorism deterrence strategy cost, in terms of dollars and diplomatic capital? How much will it cost to extend that strategy to our allies? Do our allies even want to be under such an umbrella? Most importantly, does the actual threat of nuclear terrorism justify the cost of its deterrence strategy and can such a rationale be reliably sold to the American voter?

3. Conquering context -- Like nuclear weapons states, terrorist groups seeking nuclear weapons have different political agendas. They are also willing to risk different degrees of punishment to pull off a nuclear plot. There is also the issue of how to deal with an intentional nuclear weapons transfer conducted by rogue elements of the government (or only part of a split government, i.e. Iran). Is it even possible to craft an abstract idea, such as deterrence, to deal with an incredibly complex issue that depends heavily on the context of each instance of nuclear terrorism

Nonproliferation LOLs - 30 March 2007

Paul K. pulled out a great quote related to the North Korean nuclear situation out of Wednesday's Choson Ilbo:

When North Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan met his U.S. counterpart Christopher Hill in New York on March 5, a source familiar with U.S.-North Korean relations says, Kim asked Hill to “treat us the way you treat India.”

lol.

No, seriously - I feel for Chris Hill, I really do. He's the guy who has to negotiate an nuclear arms control agreement on behalf of an administration that doesn't believe in arms control and is preparing for a more proliferated world. That kind of job clearly falls into the 'sucks' category.

What nonproliferation means to them

Dr. Lewis over at ACW picked up on an article by Jofi Joseph in the National Endowment for Democracy's Democracy Journal [ed. Democracy Journal is actually different from NED's similarly titled Journal of Democracy publication. Thanks to Jofi for pointing that out.] about the intrinsic flaws of the Bush administration's approach to nonproliferation.

Joseph's article is even-handed and well reasoned. My only criticism is that he didn't thoroughly explore why the Bush administration's preference for strategic decisions and disdain towards coercive diplomacy. How does an administration that appears to be obsessed with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction willingly accept the cost of its 'tough guy' policies? How do policy makers on the National Security Council and in the President's cabinet deal with the fact their emphasis on the strategic decision is often the reason why their policies fail?

A Bush administration critic would probably point to negative qualities, such as a lack of creativity and flexibility or an undeserving sense of self-righteousness?

I think there is a logical explanation for Bush administration policy that goes beyond personalities and simple partisan arguments. The key is taking all of the elements of Bush nonproliferation policy together at once (they are arranged in no particular order):

+ The 'Axis of Evil' statement

+ Torpedoing the Biological Weapons Convention implementation talks

+ Abandoning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

+ Fielding national missile defense

+ The Moscow Treaty

+ The Proliferation Security Initiative

+ Rolling on Congressional pressure for the Reliable Replacement Warhead

+ The Bush-Singh nuclear deal

+ Strategic decision-based policy towards Iraq and Iran's nuclear programs

+ Foot-dragging on renewal of the START verification process

There appear to be a few common themes here. The most glaring one is a belief that weapons proliferation is inevitable. Another is an emphasis on the maintenance of U.S. preeminence instead of U.S. leadership in the international community. Quite possibly the most significant theme is a rejection of the classical notion of nuclear stability through mutual vulnerability.

Preparing for a more proliferated world: If you take together the Bush administration's push to field national missile defense (and acceptance of the RRW), its willingness to 'blow a ginormous hole' in the NPT for India while simultaneously allowing the most significant nuclear confidence building measure ever lapse, and its clear preference for the conclusiveness of military action over diplomatic negotiations, I think the White House's proliferation pessimism becomes pretty clear. Each one of these characteristics have been carefully crafted to maximize the flexibility and relative strength of the U.S. in a more proliferated world.

U.S. preeminence instead of U.S. leadership: This idea dates back to Condi Rice's "Promoting the National Interest" from the January/February 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs and extends all the way through the run-up to the Second Persian Gulf War to today. The goal of U.S. nonproliferation policy is not to prevent proliferation by establishing norms and constraints on would-be proliferators. Instead, it is a more subtle policy calculation that values enhancing U.S. advantages against proliferators more than improving the disincentives for proliferation. The Bush administration's different approach to each member of the 'Axis of Evil' epitomizes this theme.

No more MAD: There are three key examples of this characteristic. The first is the Bush administration's willingness to field a national missile defense before most of the components are even ready. The second is the 2002 revision of the Nuclear Posture Review, which put nuclear weapons on the same footing as conventional capabilities. The third was early Bush administration initiatives to enhance the 'usability' of nuclear weapons, including very small yields, 'reduced collateral damage' warheads and the robust nuclear earth penetrator.

In the context of these three themes, every policy initiative listed above certainly seems logical. The problem is that these policies convey the deep proliferation pessimism and skepticism they are based on to the international community. As the most powerful state in that community, Bush administration policy has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it continues to cast off the vestments the arms control and nonproliferation institutions built between the Cuban missile crisis and September 11th.

These institutions were not perfect, but they were definitely successful. Is the long-term cost of continuing to abandon them over the next few years really worth the short-term victories the Bush administration seeks?

Note: Sorry about the reformatting. Feels like I've been using right-align too often.

Chris Hill: 'Initial Actions' is 'Six Million Dollar Man,' not 'Back to the Future'

The U.S.'s lead negotiator at the Six Party Talks, Christopher Hill gave a speech at the Brookings Institution today defending the Initial Actions for Implementation of the Joint Statement issued earlier this month. Some in the disarmament community, including yours truly, snarked at the statement for being largely a carbon copy of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Bush administration walked away from the Agreed Framework pretty casually around 2002, citing intelligence on North Korean efforts to covertly enrich uranium.

I've always seen that move as somewhat of a draw for both sides. The U.S. was right to criticize the North Koreans for their subterfuge, but the North Koreans didn't essentially violate their commitments. In fact, the Agreed Framework does not even mention the words "uranium" or "enrichment." You could make the case that the North Koreans violated their safeguards agreement, which was one of the final provisions of the agreement. Indeed, the uranium enrichment issue continues to be a huge complicating factor for negotiations as Hill's comments today indicate:

Of course, in this discussion, we will face the problem, in fact, the very serious problem of the highly enriched uranium program. We have information, and I have seen the information – a number of countries have seen the information – that the DPRK, the North Koreans, made certain purchases of equipment which is entirely consistent with a highly enriched uranium program.

Of course, it is a complex program. It would require a lot more equipment than we know that they have actually purchased. It requires some production techniques, some considerable production techniques that we are not sure whether they have mastered those. But, certainly, we need to have a discussion about where they are on this because we need some explanation of what was purchased. For example, we know that they attempted to purchase some aluminum tubes from Germany. In fact, there was a court case with respect to these aluminum tubes. We have some indications that they were successful in getting some of these tubes elsewhere. By the way, these are tubes that we know have the fit, the type of Pakistani designed centrifuges that we know they have also which we know from Pakistani sources that they have also procured.

So at some point, we need to see what has happened to this equipment. If the tubes did not go into a highly enriched uranium program, maybe they went somewhere else, fine. We can have a discussion about where they are and where they have gone.

I have raised the issue of highly enriched uranium with the North Koreans on just about every occasion we have met with them, certainly on all the Six-Party meetings, and we have agreed that we can discuss this. I want to make very clear, though, the North Koreans have not acknowledged having an HEU program. They have not acknowledged that, but they have been willing to discuss what we know and to try to resolve this to mutual satisfaction. We don’t know whether we are going to be able to do that, but we have agreed to have this discussion.

Jeez, it looks like Pakistani centrifuges are pretty popular these days. What happens when Paris Hilton buys one, covers it in diamonds and then takes it out to a club with Britney and Lindsay Lohan? Seriously though, the Bush administration's tough approach on North Korea's enrichment program was bound to fail because it is nearly impossible to pressure a state that you already threaten with massive retaliation. How the U.S. raise the stakes? Blow Pyongyang up twice?

In the administration's defense, they did manage to shut down North Korea's counterfeiting operations in Macao. I'm slightly dubious of the legality of this move, but I will save that for a later post.

Anyways, Hill makes the case that the Initial Actions where not just Back to the Future, but instead, something more akin to the Six Million Dollar Man ('Gentlemen, we can rebuild him... Better than he was before. Better…stronger…faster.'). I've excerpted some of his key points:

In addition to our bilateral talk, there is also envisioned a Japanese-North Korean bilateral negotiation, and here too there are some issues that are especially very important on the Japanese side, issues for which the Japanese Government and, frankly, the Japanese people need some closure. Most importantly, from Japan’s point of view is, of course, the issue of abductions. And so, this has to be addressed. We are not expecting this problem to be resolved immediately, but certainly there needs to be a mechanism that Japan and North Korea can agreed on to address these issues.

Again, it is not going to be easy, but it clearly is a very important issue, especially important issue from the point of view of the Japanese public. The families of people who were abducted for various purposes 25 years ago, they need some clarity on what happened. As Japan and North Korea sit down together to address the prospects of normalizing their relationship, they are going to have to deal with these outstanding issues of concern.

Yes, the Japanese are an intensely idiosyncratic people. Yes, they do indeed find the abduction of potentially less than 100 Japanese citizens back in the late 1970s and early 1980s more important than the North Korean nuclear issue. The fact of the matter is that Shinzo Abe has staked the viability of his government on resolving this issue. If all it takes to keep Japan on message during the Six Party Talks is making sure Japan gets to air its relatively minor issue (in terms of regional security), then so be it.

In addition, finally, there will be a working group to discuss some of the future relationships that we would hope to address, that is, future relationships in the overall region. And so, we are looking at having a working group to begin to chart out how a Northeast Asia peace and security working group can look at overall problems in the region and can look ahead to see how we can begin or to strengthen multilateral processes in the region.

I have said on many occasions, and I strongly believe that Northeast Asia is truly one of the most exciting and successful parts of the world, and yet there should be a greater sense of and greater development of multilateral institutions. We hope that the Six-Party process can be a kind of embryonic structure, that if we can get through this very difficult task in front of us, that is, the denuclearization task, it can move on and do some other tasks.

Often, people in Northeast Asia say, well, you have no idea the difficult history we have had in Northeast Asia. Well, we do have an idea of the difficult history Northeast Asia has. By the way, there are other parts of the world that have also had very difficult histories, and I must say Europe comes to mind. When you look at what has been done in Europe in terms of multilateral structures, it is truly impressive, and I think it is an inspiration to those of us in North America but also should be an inspiration to Northeast Asia. So we would like to do some more on these things.

As I mentioned in my initial assessment, the 'Initial Actions' take the huge step of setting the stage for a permanent multilateral security dialogue for Northeast Asia. Although this dialogue won't essentially turn into a new regional security order over night (or possibly even at all), it does represent a shift away from traditional U.S. policy.

This clear signal is all the more ironic considering the second report on the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance issued by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye was also released this month. Their first report essentially advocated changing the U.S.-Japanese alliance to mirror the U.S.'s relationship with the United Kingdom. Needless to say, it was not well received by Japanese scholars or politicians. Their second report scales things back a bit and focuses on building an 'open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values.' The report also suggests turning out the alliance like a Bangkok hooker on a Saturday night in order to promote trilateral cooperation with all of the usual johns: China, India, Australia, ASEAN, APEC, etc. It also advocates using the alliance as the basis for common policy towards the tense situations on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.

I guess I have bored my non-Asia specialist readers with enough policy chatter for now. I'll make it up to you by posting something cool, I promise.

Blast from the Past: Latest 6-P Talks joint statement

I just read the latest joint statement agreeded to by the six parties (China, Russia, Japan, the U.S. and North and South Korea) and I almost cried. Not out of elation or sadness, but because it reminded me so much of the 1994 Agreed Framework and 1994 always makes me think about the death of Kurt Cobain. Here is a summary of today's statement:

---

I. The Six Parties reaffirm their intention to implementing the September 2005 joint statement in a 'step-by-step' fashion. (see this ACW post for a good description of how Joe Rood's unilateral reinterpertation of U.S. commitments in the 2005 JS caused implementation to fall apart before it even began)

II.

1) North Korea will power down and seal the graphite-moderated Magnox reactor at Yongbyon.

2) North Korea will disclose all of its nuclear activities.

3) The U.S. and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including consideration of taking Pyongyang off the state-sponsors of terror list and easing some unilateral sanctions.

4) Japan and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including North Korean grievances originating from the Japanese occupation and the status of the Japanese citizens kidnapped by the Norks back in the 70s (not explicitly stated, but definitely in the subtext).

5) Reaffirms the first three clauses of the JS issued two years ago. This includes commitments to normalizing relations all around, an affirmation that U.S. nuclear weapons are off the Korean peninsula and will not return and commitments to provide energy aid to Pyongyang.

III. The Six Parties will establish working groups on Korean denulearization, energy assistance to the North, the normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo/Washington and a East Asian 'peace and security' mechanism.

IV. The North Koreans will receive up to 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (with an initial shipment of 50,000 tons) once they declare and begin dismantling their nuclear program.

V. The Six Parties agree to future ministerial meetings to monitor implementation and explore other subjects to promote 'peace and security' in East Asia.

VI. The Six Parties will work to build mutual trust and peace in the region. Peace between the North and South will be handled in a different (probably bilateral) venue.

VII. The Six Parties will meet again on March 19th for the sixth round of talks.

---

The lack of a firm promise to provide North Korea with a permanent substitute for the energy generated by Yongbyon (i.e. light-water nuclear reactors) and a commitment to continue six-party consultations on larger security issues are the two major differences between today's JS and the Agreed Framework.

These changes definitely reflect the Bush administration's qualitatively different approach to security East Asia and nonproliferation. In terms of East Asia, the U.S. has chosen a position that is long on revisionist rhetoric (shaping China's rise, regime change in North Korea, etc.), but is short on similar policies. The administration's most substantial policy shift in my eyes was Bush solidifying the status quo in the Taiwan Strait back in 2003 by writing off U.S. support for a unilateral declaration of Taiwanese independence. That was a pretty big step away from revisionism for a man who declared the the U.S. will do "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself" in the opening days of his presidency.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the White House is still moving away from the 'hub-and-spoke' model of relations towards East Asia that the U.S. has used to maximize its leverage over Japan, Korea and Taiwan for the past 40 years. Converting the six-party format into a semi-permanent regional security dialogue is a critical first step towards East Asian security integration. One thing is for sure, this certainly wouldn't have been possible with a sino-phobic Rumsfeld still at the helm of the DOD.

The JS is also interesting because it toes the administration's belief that nuclear proliferators should completely abdicate their right to even peaceful, proliferation resistant nuclear technology. Previous administrations have been willing to trade light-water reactors and the Additional Protocol in exchange for dismantlement, but the White House's expandive definition of 'nuclear capability' generally foreclose that route.

This may be practical option for states with minimal nuclear know-how like Iran, but it doesn't seem very practical for North Korea considering that they (kind of) crossed the nuclear threshold last year.

This may all be a moot in few months anyways, considering each party's seeming inability to implement their side of the JS in good faith. Then again, the years I've spent studying Japan, Taiwan and China have given me a pretty cynical view of the East Asian security environment.

Busy Busy Busy

I have received a few grumpy e-mails regarding my recent lack of posts. The causes of this are twofold:

1) My recently departed boss in the Army secretariat has finally been replaced with a newly-minted SES from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. He's a nice guy with long experience on the business side of security cooperation, but he is a relative lightweight in the technology department. I was elected to give him a tutorial on missile technology and proliferation that inadvertantly ate up a good portion of my week.

2) The recent spate of helo shootdowns shootdowns has whipped the defense science community into a stir. Weapons managers are once again looking at the relative efficacy of different countermeasures technologies. One thing is for certain, I've heard the word "dazzler" more times in the last week than it is typically used at the average cheerleading competition.

I was originally planning on posting something about MANPADS, but David Hambling beat me to the punch over at DT. I may still write something about U.S. efforts to reign in MANPADS proliferation, provided it doesn't bore my readers.

My boss is also having be write a criticism of DOD attempts at 'defense transformation' that I think I post later this week.

Somalia as a blueprint? Get real.

Pentagon Sees Move in Somalia as Blueprint
NYT, January 13, 2007

WASHINGTON, Jan. 12 — Military operations in Somalia by American commandos, and the use of the Ethiopian Army as a surrogate force to root out operatives for Al Qaeda in the country, are a blueprint that Pentagon strategists say they hope to use more frequently in counterterrorism missions around the globe.

I can't believe that the Pentagon seriously believes Ethopia's recent offensive in Somalia aimed at expunging the Islamic Courts Union is a viable blueprint for any future counterterrorism missions. What kind of blueprint would that be anyway?

"Let al Qaeda operatives hide in a lawless country for years until they hitch their star to some rising nascent Islamist movement and just hope the new Islamist government tempts fate with a neighboring country friendly to the U.S. willing to invade them before they can establish stable terror camps at attack the West"?

That doesn't exactly sound like a solid plan to me. In fact, I think it didn't pan out very well for the U.S. in Afghanistan before September 11th. How about instead of backing warlords who are so two-faced that they were the one's attacking us a decade ago, why don't we invest more building political stability or backing up transitional governments in weak states?

U.S. military force isn't the ultimate pancea for terrorism and insurgencies. Jobs, political stability and government that is a viable alternative to warlordism and tribalism are. Strategies that minimize long-term diplomatic or political investments in favor of rapid military solutions don't always work. They give the illusion of providing maximum flexibility to the U.S. when all we are reallying doing is just sitting around waiting for a perfect moment to act that may never come.

If you don't agree with me, just look at how far our much heralded combating WMD strategy has gotten us since its inception in 2002. As Gedde Watanabe would say, "Nothing, absolutely nothing."

Translation: CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes

This is a bit of a puff piece from today's Yomiuri on a recent development in China-Japan-Korea (CJK) relations, but I need more translation practice.

CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes
January 14, 2007

[Cebu (central Philippines)] Prime Minister Abe, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun presented a joint declaration demanding North Korea "take definitive and effective steps towards" nuclear disarmament at 1600 (Tokyo time) from their hotel in Cebu.

The declaration also contained a statement that final negotiations on the "Japan, China and Korea Investment Agreement" concerning the enlargment of investment between the three countries will begin soon.

This is the first summit between Japanese, Chinese and Korean leadership since a suspension two years ago caused by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's contraversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine.

In regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, Prime Minister stressed that "the Six Party Talks are not making substantial progress. It is important for each country to apply an appropriate amount of pressure to urge the North Koreans to make the political decision to denuclearize." President Roh explained that appropriate sanctions included a "suspension of South Korean rice and fertilizer support," while Prime Minister Wen responded that "Six Party talks was a valid process" and that "Japan, China and Korea wanted to cooperatively implement a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

In regard to the abduction issue, Prime Minister Abe stated that "it is regrettable that North Korea is not correspondingly sincere (towards resolving the issue)" and requested Chinese and Korean understanding and cooperation on the matter. Both the Chinese and Korean leaders did not immediately answer, but the joint declaration did reference the abduction issue with a statement that "emphaszied the importance of coping with concerns towards the humanity of all peoples."

The joint declaration also included (1) the establishment of mechanism to allow high-level foreign ministry consultations, (2) a pledge for greater cooperation on environmental issues, including silting and water pollution, and (3) an expression of support for United Nations reform, including reform to the UN Security Council.

The seeming benality of the meeting and joint declaration betrays how tense relations between China, Japan and Korea have been for the last few years. Between Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, some rough times over the gas fields in East China Sea and the protests sparked by Kofi Annan's suggestion that Japan should get a permanent seat on the Security Council, relations between Japan, China and Korea have been frigid. The fact that the three countries haven't had mechanisms to handle working-level diplomatic consultations should speak to how weak relations within the region have been for decades.

I guess now is as good a time as any to start a thaw, now that Shinzo Abe is in power and North Korean missile and nuclear tests have forced Japanese, Chinese and South Korean policy towards Pyongyang as close together as they have ever been.

PSI: The Bureaucratic Zombie

Another portion of H.R. 1 that should viewed with a skeptical eye is the bit on everyone's favorite bureaucratic zombie in the nonproliferation world: SEC. 1221. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE IMPROVEMENTS AND AUTHORITIES.

(a) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress, consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, that the President should strive to expand and strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the President on May 31, 2003, with a particular emphasis on the following:

(1) Issuing a presidential directive to the relevant government agencies and departments that establishes a defined annual budget and clear authorities, and provides other necessary resources and structures to achieve more efficient and effective performance of United States PSI-related activities.

(2) Working with the United Nations Security Council to develop a resolution to authorize the PSI under international law.

(3) Increasing PSI cooperation with non-NATO partners.

(4) Implementing the recommendations of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the September 2006 report titled `Better Controls Needed to Plan and Manage Proliferation Security Initiative Activities' (GAO-06-937C), including the following:

(A) The Department of Defense and the Department of State should establish clear PSI roles and responsibilities, policies and procedures, interagency communication mechanisms, documentation requirements, and indicators to measure program results.

(B) The Department of Defense and the Department of State should develop a strategy to work with PSI-participating countries to resolve issues that are impediments to conducting successful PSI interdictions.

(5) Expanding and formalizing the PSI into a multilateral regime to increase coordination, cooperation, and compliance among its participating states in interdiction activities.

(b) Budget Submission- The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit a defined budget for the PSI, beginning with the budget submissions for their respective departments for fiscal year 2009.

(c) Implementation Report- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the implementation of this section. The report shall include--

(1) the steps taken to implement the recommendations described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a); and

(2) the progress made toward implementing the matters described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5) of subsection (a).

(d) GAO Annual Report- The Government Accountability Office shall submit to Congress, beginning in fiscal year 2007, an annual report with its assessment of the progress and effectiveness of the PSI, which shall include an assessment of the measures referred to in subsection (a). I always heard that PSI was the brain child of John Bolton and that few in the State Department planned to further the program after his departure to Turtle Bay. It doesn't help that State has pointedly refused to provide more than scant details about PSI activities to the public and when they do, the information is usually misleading. Pardon my skepticism, but I wouldn't be surprised if the executive branch's silence on the program is more due to inactivity since PSI exercises in 2005 than classification issues.

In defense of the program, it did result in a raft of boarding agreements with many of the more notorious "flags of comfort" states (i.e. Liberia, Panama Cyprus). The U.S. also tried to turn PSI's brief momentum into a protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) that would make it illegal for nonmilitary ships to intentionally transport or launch nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. It also bans mounting such weapons on fixed sea platforms (i.e. oil rigs).

The protocol was drafted back in 2005 and has been open for ratification since February 2006, but it isn't clear how many states have signed or ratified it. Either way, the PSI portion of H.R. 1 smacks of too little Congressional being applied too late (much like the many CFIUS bills that came out of the Dubai Ports World debacle).

As a side note, I could probably write a book about Section 501 from H.R. 1 that requires all container cargo inbound to the U.S. be screened and sealed before it even leaves its home port. Now would be a good time to get a job as a transit advisor for Customs and Border Protection because the demand for U.S. technical assistance abroad would balloon under this new rule.

United States Coordinator of Preventing WMD Proliferation, Terrorism, AIDS, Genocide and Smoking

To further explore the mild outrage currently being experience by individuals, such as J. Sigger and myself, I want to highlight the really disturbing portion of H.R. 1. Sections 1241 through 1257 of H.R. 1 create a U.S. Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism and a corresponding commission of the same title. I am distrubed by the notion that our elected representatives believe the resources, expertise and programs required to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism are even remotely related. Sure, there is that hypothetical nexus between WMD and terrorism that President Bush loves to wax poetic about, but attacking this one point of failure doesn't seem very practical. What about non-WMD terrorism or non-terrorist proliferation? Since my stupid-sense was tingling, I decided to look at the resolution's actual language: SEC. 1241. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM. (a) Establishment- There is established within the Executive Office of the President an office to be known as the `Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism' (in this subtitle referred to as the `Office'). [snip] (c) Duties- The responsibilities of the Coordinator shall include the following:

(1) Serving as the advisor to the President on all matters relating to the prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism. (2) Formulating a comprehensive and well-coordinated United States strategy and policies for preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism, including--

(A) measurable milestones and targets to which departments and agencies can be held accountable;

(B) identification of gaps, duplication, and other inefficiencies in existing activities, initiatives, and programs and the steps necessary to overcome these obstacles;

(C) plans for preserving the nuclear security investment the United States has made in Russia, the former Soviet Union, and other countries;

(D) prioritized plans to accelerate, strengthen, and expand the scope of existing initiatives and programs, which include identification of vulnerable sites and material and the corresponding actions necessary to eliminate such vulnerabilities;

(E) new and innovative initiatives and programs to address emerging challenges and strengthen United States capabilities, including programs to attract and retain top scientists and engineers and strengthen the capabilities of United States national laboratories;

(F) plans to coordinate United States activities, initiatives, and programs relating to the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism, including those of the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security, and including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism;

(G) plans to strengthen United States commitments to international regimes and significantly improve cooperation with other countries relating to the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism, with particular emphasis on work with the international community to develop laws and an international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable any state in the world to interdict and prosecute smugglers of WMD material, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission; and

(H) identification of actions necessary to implement the recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism established under subtitle E of this title.

Does anyone else see a pattern here? Namely, the strategic inclusion of the phase "and terrorism" after the word proliferation? The coordinator is responsible for coordinating all of the federal government's nonproliferation activities and gets to attend some posh G-8 meetings. He or she will even get figure out ways to keep our bored nuclear weapons complex packed full of brains. His or her connection to domestic or international counterterrorism activities, on the other hand, will be nonexistent. The notion of terrorism seems like a window-dressing. The same myopia is applied to the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism: SEC. 1254. RESPONSIBILITIES. (a) In General- The Commission shall address--

(1) the roles, missions, and structure of all relevant government departments, agencies, and other actors, including the Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism established under subtitle D of this title; (2) inter-agency coordination; (3) United States commitments to international regimes and cooperation with other countries; and (4) the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism to the United States and its interests and allies, including the threat posed by black-market networks, and the effectiveness of the responses by the United States and the international community to such threats.

(b) Follow-on Baker-Cutler Report- The Commission shall also reassess, and where necessary update and expand on, the conclusions and recommendations of the report titled `A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia' of January 2001 (also known as the `Baker-Cutler Report') and implementation of such recommendations. If the government is having so much trouble coordinating its nonproliferation programs and translating the vagaries of its 'combating WMD' mission in action, why not focus this coordinator and commission entirely on nonproliferation issues? Why put unnecessary blinders of 'and terrorism' on an otherwise potentially effacious idea? But then again, maybe I'm just crazy...

Updates: Somalia and Export Controls

First, I wanted to say that I'm surprised by how successfully the transitional government of Somalia routed the ICU over the last week. The transitional government President, Abdullahi Yusuf, returned to Mogadishu today. There has been some protests and violence, but the media hasn't characterized it as distinctly Islamist:

On Saturday, security forces fired in the air to disperse crowds, as youths burnt tyres and threw stones, witnesses said. At least two civilians were killed and several others injured by gunfire, but it was not clear who was responsible. President Yusuf has always been wary of going to MogadishuAnother protest was held in the town of Beledweyne, near the border with Ethiopia, with one death reported.

If Somalia's Islamists are anything like the Taliban, they should be able to put together a guerrilla campaign in a year - if they disperse now. I'll definitely be keeping an on developments southern Somalia over the next few weeks. On to the second topic: export controls. Export controls are the least glamorous component of the U.S. arms control and nonproliferation regime, but they have the potential to throw a huge monkey wrench in how the U.S. does business abroad. Case in point - the State Department slapped down Lockheed Martin for using the "but we had a DoD contract" excuse:

According to the charging letter that preceded the consent agreement, Sippican continued to provide technical data after a TAA had expired, provided technical data to parties not authorized under the TAA, and provided technical data explicitly excluded by a proviso to one of the TAAs. In particular, Sippican provided controlled technical data classified at a level higher than Secret even though the TAA in effect at the time only permit transfer of data up to the Secret level. During discussions with DDTC, Sippican attempted to argue that it transferred the classified data in question because that was required by the Navy contract. [snip] DDTC is, of course, correct that a government contract does not eliminate the need for an export license. That being said, it seems that DDTC did not fully understand the background that I surmise led Sippican to make that argument. This would not be the first time that military contracting officers, anxious for the contract to proceed rapidly, pressured contractors to provide deliverables or data without going through the 3-4 month wait (or more) for an export authorization from DDTC. Indeed, in more than one instance with which I’m aware, the contracting officer has represented that no license was necessary precisely because the military was requesting the unlicensed export.

If the $3 million fine tacked on the consent agreement doesn't cause a palpable chilling effect in the defense industry, I don't know what will. The flap with the UK over to technical data for the Joint Strike Fighter that was just resolved last month is just the beginning. Once promised international cooperation on politically-sensitive, big-ticket weapons systems - such as national missile defense (if Congress doesn't kill it before then) - starts to take off of a few years from now, we will see just how deep this rabbit hole goes.

Translation: France provided nuclear assistance to Taiwan in the 1970s, according to secret British document

There was an interesting article in the Nikkei on friday about French involvement in Taiwanese nuclear development. Taiwan began developing nuclear weapons in 1967, just three years after the People's Republic's first successful nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964. The program apparently continued apace even after Taiwan lost its United Nations Security Council seat and diplomatic recognition around most of the world in 1971. Taipei publicly bowed to U.S. pressure to end their weapons development program in 1976 when Chiang Ching-Guo announced it would stop reprocessing plutonium at Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology's Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER). Despite this public statement, the Taiwanese secretly continued nuclear development for another decade. After a high-level defection to the U.S. and being caught violating their safegaurds by the IAEA, Taiwan finally dismantled their only pressurized heavy water reactor in 1988. Since Taiwan did not have the indigenous physical or intellectual resources needed for a nuclear program, it had to go fishing far and wide for assistance. The extent of foreign involvement is pretty well know thanks to the efforts of groups like NTI, FAS, and the National Security Archive, but apparently the British have more to say on the subject: France provided nuclear assistance to Taiwan in the 1970s, according to secret British documents December 29, 2006

Secret documents declassified by the National Archives of the United Kingdom on the 29th of December revealed that France supported Taiwanese facilities used to reprocess nuclear fuel into weapons grade uranium when Taiwan had an active nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. The UK considered the possibility of providing limited assistance to the Taiwanese nuclear program, but ultimately decided against it. Antognized by the advent of Mainland China's nuclear arsenal, Taiwan attempted a crash nuclear weapons program, but the U.S. pressured Taipei into ending the program because of the impact it would have on its relations with China and the cross-strait military balance. Since the U.S. would not provide positive cooperation, there was evidence that the European nuclear powers Britain and France might if their support was sought. [ed. That is one messy passive sentence in Japanese] Although the details of France's support are not known, it was possible for the French to broach the subject because they were not a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at the time (France didn't sign until 1992). [ed. Taiwan was effectively expelled from the NPT when the People's Republic of China took Taipei's seat at the United Nationsin 1971] According to the secret documents, a May 1974 Joint Intelligence Committee meeting of representatives from all of Britain's intelligence agencies drew up a report that expressed its doubts about the Taiwan's nuclear development. Then Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who read this report, asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Office if an offer of materials used for nuclear weapons development would be a violation of the NPT. In a report regarding French support to Taiwan, the FCO response was "The exporting nuclear materials is possible." Prime Minister Wilson reportly conveyed a concen that "Taiwanese acquisition of nuclear weapons would invite the risk of global instability." Then Foreign Secretary James Callaghan said to the Prime Minister in March 1976 that the UK must follow through on Taiwanese expressions of interest in importing British nuclear materials and technology because it was possible to arrange a deal that would not result in proliferation. Wilson responded doubtfully, "Are the Secretary's ideas really prudent?" Soon after, James Callaghan became Prime Minister. In April of 1976, he stated that Britain "should not make any deal with Taiwan that would further their nuclear weapons program in any way," which marked a fundamental shift in his position.

I've been digging around the UK National Archives website , but I haven't had much luck finding the documents that the article references - it may take a while for the documents to be promulgated online. I had a little trouble getting the last sentence in the second to last paragraph to work in English, so I'd like to see if my translation is even close to what actually happened. Interestingly enough, I haven't found analogous articles about this revelation in either British or English-language Taiwanese new sources. If any of my Francophone readers happen to find something in the French media on this topic.

Translation: Shimane Univ. reprimanded for allowing researcher to buy uranium off the Net

I came across this story while scanning asahi.com today. It is about a Chinese research student at Shimane University (Shimane Prefecture) who was reprimanded for purchasing about 3 grams of yellowcake. The article isn't exactly clear on which uranium oxide it was, but it is probably safe to assume it was the most common form, triuranium oxide. Here is my translation: "Shimane University Researcher Buys Uranium on the Internet, MEXT Issues a Reprimand" December 20, 2006, 9:45pm

"On the 20th of December, Shimane University announced that a former Chinese researcher from its Interdisciplinary Faculty of Science and Engineering purchased 2.8 grams of yellowcake over the Internet from a distributor in the U.S. Under laws policing nuclear materials, the university does have permission to own small quantities (less than 300 grams) for research purposes, but it does not have approval to purchase such material from abroad. Shimane Univerity was reprimanded in a report issued by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). The report also indicated no one has been effected by radiation. [ed. This may seem random, but the Japanese are obsessed with radiation] The MEXT Nuclear Safety Division has never heard of nuclear materials being purchased over the internet before. In September of last year, the Chinese researcher ordered 2.6 grams of yellowcake, 0.128 grams of uranium metal and 0.068 grams of thorium dixode from an American distributor over the internet to use a reference substances for radiometric dating. The materials were delivered in a small, single bundle to a university research lab by a parcel service in June of this year. The triuranium oxide was packed in a test tube in powder form. The millimeter-sized rectangular flecks of uranium and thorium dixode were packed in plastic containers wadded with cotton. In July, the university consulted with MEXT about filing a request for permission to possess the materials, more than half a year after the fact. A panel of outside nuclear experts were brought in to investigate the how and why of the violation because the researcher returned to China last November, two months after the purchase. When contacted, the researcher claimed he was unaware of the laws governing nuclear materials when he made the purchases. According to the MEXT Nuclear Safety Division, countries manage the use and sale of uranium and thorium by issuing liscenses for each transaction. Shimane University is not allowed to make purchases from unliscensed distributors, regardless of whether they are located inside or outside of Japan."

The researcher bought three grams of yellowcake from the U.S. over the internet and left for home without telling anyone. Simply awesome. That probably had to be one of the more surprising FedEx deliveries of 2006. I'm just glad the first successful illegal purchse of radioactive material over the internet on the books was so mundane.

Translation of the Sankei article on the Japanese nuclear industry

Okay, I finally broke down and started my own blog on the various things I bother the good folks at Defensetech.org and the Arms Control Wonk about on a regular basis. That and I need to an excuse to practice my Japanese ahead of an exit exam at GWU in March. To inaugurate this blog, I will have reproduced the rough translation of a December 25th article from the Sankei Shimbun on the Japanese government's recent report on that country's nascent nuclear weapons capacity. Here is the bulk of the item: "Japanese Government Internal Report Says 3-Plus Years and 200-300 Billion Yen to Build Nuke Prototype" December 12, 2006, 2:38am

According to a government report released on the 24th of December, it would take 3-5 years to build a prototype of a miniaturized nuclear warhead. The report “The Domestic Potential for Nuclear Weapons” says that although Japan has the uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities needed, technical limitations would make it difficult to divert them to weapons production. A discussion of revising the first part of Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” has emerged since the North Korean nuclear test the report confirmed the reality that hypothetical Japanese nuclear weapons would be starting from ‘square one.’ The report was proposed on the 20th of September. It went forward after the North Korean nuclear test on the 9th of October. It would take at least 3 years and 200-300 billion yen to mobilize the hundreds of technical needed to build a miniature nuclear warhead prototype. This would be good enough for a hypothetical nuclear-armed Japan to check North Korean nuclear threats alone. The ingredients of nuclear weapons would include uranium for the type of bomb used over Hiroshima or plutonium for the type of bomb used over Nagasaki. The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (Ibaraki Prefecture) and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility (Aomori Prefecture) can do both uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing. However, using their light water reactors will not yield weapons-grade plutonium. Enrichment facilities only manufacture low-enriched uranium that is only enriched to 3% and the facilities frequently experience mechanical problems, so expanding enrichment would be difficult. According to the government report, Japan would have to construct a graphite-moderated breeder reactor and expand its reprocessing facilities to produce enough Pu 239 needed for a nuclear arsenal. It would also be difficult for Japan to miniaturize nuclear warheads because there are many gaps in the technical knowledge required for development.

The results of this report don't really surprise me too much. Sure, Japan has dozens of nuclear power plants with some limited plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment capacity, but it is only enough to support the country's reactor requirements. The large-scale production facilities needed to produce fissile material efficiently can't just be dreamed up over night, even for the technically adroit Japanese.