Translation: "Taepodong 2 drops off the coast of North Korea, 400 kilometers --> dozens of kilometers, complete failure"

Dr. J over at the ArmsControlWonk asked me to run down the Mainichi Shimbun article referenced in the first paragraph of AFP story from July 30, 2006. By the power of Greyskull and the wonder of Dow Jones's Factiva, I managed to track it down and the following rough translation (the original Japanese text has been attached to the comments section):

"Taepodong 2 drops off the coast of North Korea, 400 kilometers --> dozens of kilometers, complete failure"

* No Dong 2 and Scud 4 also tested -- Japanese Defense Agency report.

July 30, 2006

By Akitaka Furuhon

The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) released an outline of a reconnaissance report concerning high-profile ballistic missile tests conducted in the vicinity of North Korea on July 29. Of the seven missiles tested, it concludes that the third missile, which has specifically classified as the two-stage Taepodong 2, was a complete failure. The 400 kilometer flight path estimated was revised to read "Only a few dozen miles off of the coast in North Korean waters." Of the remaining six missiles, report concluded that two were "No Dongs" and four where "Scuds."

The July report was the result of the JDA reconciling early information like missile trajectories seen by the Marine Self-Defense Forces' Aegis cruiser radars with later data from the U.S. military's ground-based radar.

The Taepodong 2 missile was launched from Musudanri in northeastern North Korean. Its first stage is newly designed booster and its second stage is a Nodong missile. At first, the missile appeared to have dropped into the ocean 350 kilometers north-north west of the coast of Niigata prefecture, which would have been a distance of 400 kilometers. The result of several data analyses, however, revised this distance based on the conclusion that the first stage burned out after 40 seconds and the second stage did not separate. The observed burn time of less than three minutes under normal operating conditions leads to the conclusion that test was a complete failure.

On the one hand, the report said "the probability that the missile's target was the Pacific Ocean is high," but it avoided specifics because the launch was far from normal.

The remaining six missiles were launched towards the northeast from Kittaeryong in southeastern North Korea and they were seen falling into the ocean about 400 miles away. The missile trajectories were not tracked long enough for accurate analysis, but the report ends it analysis by stating "the six launched missiles fell within dozens of kilometers of their range" without providing the actual impact sites.

Using the six missile's initial velocity and burn pattern, two were classified as No Dongs and the four others were classified as Scuds. Based on the trajectory analysis, the report judges that a new IRBM (Editor's Note: the Japanese author translates the acronym IRBM to 'submarine-launched medium range missile' -- like the Norks have subs large enough) currently in development was not included in the tests. The report does offer some minor specifics on the Scuds and ends with the observation that "it is possible that a new Scud design was included among the missiles tested."

(Editors's note: I am not very confident about my take on this next sentence) In regards to the launch procedures used by North Korea, Japanese and American intelligence agencies are waiting to see whether the tests are proclaimed a demonstration of North Korean power. The report also does not draw conclusions on North Korea's intent.

(Update: MTC was kind enough to translate the last paragraph correctly. By misinterpreting the meaning of "打ち上げ順序," I screwed the whole paragraph up -- my bad.)

As for the order of the missile firings, the intelligence agencies of both the U.S. and Japan have said, "It is really not in our best interest to reveal our capabilities." They defer on making a public statement. They will also not be confirming in a published report the mappings out of any of the missile firings.

Interesting stuff. Let me know what you think -- I'm going to weigh in on it sometime tomorrow.

What I'm listen to

I keep getting the same question from my Japanese readers: REさん、日本の音楽の中で、どれが一番好きですか？(Mr. RE, what is your favorite type of Japanese music?) Do listen to a fair amount of Japanese rap nowadays, but my favorite genre will always be Japanese metal.

Like most American aficionados of Japanese metal, my first exposure was X Japan's Blue Blood album. X Japan was a quintessential band for many reasons -- they dressed like the ill-gotten children of a one-night stand between Guns and Roses and Culture Club, their frontman hide met with a very Michael Hutchence end, their sound was very reminiscent of speed metal classics, such as Ace of Spades and Kill 'Em All.

During the heady days of Napster, when peer-to-peer sharing was really hitting its stride, I was able to sample a large portion of the Japanese metal genre. I also spent a summer in undergrad in the Kansai area, which afford me the opportunity to go to a bunch of concerts for relatively cheap (Japanese bands love to see Western fans in the audience). I would have to say my favorite band out of the genre is the now defunct speed metal group Sex Machineguns (yes, the name is a play on the Sex Pistols).

Their music videos are particularly interesting, check out this video for the 1997 hit "Burn":

And before I get a handful of quizzical e-mails asking about the guys in black jumpsuits running on treadmills and pounding mochi, I don't get it either. They show up on some of their other videos as well.

Update: I would be completely remiss if I didn't mention SEIKIMA II and their groundbreaking 1987 music video for "1999 Secret Object."

These guys are probably the most hardcore of any Japanese metal band. Like KISS, their make-up remained relatively unchanged for two decades. They also made good on their promised to break-up on December 31, 1999 and have stayed disbanded for 7 years despite popular pressure to reunite.

"World's quietest taxpayer"

I hate to get too japanophile for my American readers, but I came across this interesting music video for DJ OASIS's song "The World's Quietest Taxpayer" (featuring rap lyricist Utamaru). The lyrics to the song are a pretty strong indictment of Japanese politics, but the video tops it off with a show trial for former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Whoever says that Japanese youth are more militaristic than their parents or grandparents clearly hasn't spent any time hanging out with them.

Check out DJ OASIS's English myspace page. Its pretty obnoxious.

Blast from the Past: Latest 6-P Talks joint statement

I just read the latest joint statement agreeded to by the six parties (China, Russia, Japan, the U.S. and North and South Korea) and I almost cried. Not out of elation or sadness, but because it reminded me so much of the 1994 Agreed Framework and 1994 always makes me think about the death of Kurt Cobain. Here is a summary of today's statement:

---

I. The Six Parties reaffirm their intention to implementing the September 2005 joint statement in a 'step-by-step' fashion. (see this ACW post for a good description of how Joe Rood's unilateral reinterpertation of U.S. commitments in the 2005 JS caused implementation to fall apart before it even began)

II.

1) North Korea will power down and seal the graphite-moderated Magnox reactor at Yongbyon.

2) North Korea will disclose all of its nuclear activities.

3) The U.S. and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including consideration of taking Pyongyang off the state-sponsors of terror list and easing some unilateral sanctions.

4) Japan and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including North Korean grievances originating from the Japanese occupation and the status of the Japanese citizens kidnapped by the Norks back in the 70s (not explicitly stated, but definitely in the subtext).

5) Reaffirms the first three clauses of the JS issued two years ago. This includes commitments to normalizing relations all around, an affirmation that U.S. nuclear weapons are off the Korean peninsula and will not return and commitments to provide energy aid to Pyongyang.

III. The Six Parties will establish working groups on Korean denulearization, energy assistance to the North, the normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo/Washington and a East Asian 'peace and security' mechanism.

IV. The North Koreans will receive up to 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (with an initial shipment of 50,000 tons) once they declare and begin dismantling their nuclear program.

V. The Six Parties agree to future ministerial meetings to monitor implementation and explore other subjects to promote 'peace and security' in East Asia.

VI. The Six Parties will work to build mutual trust and peace in the region. Peace between the North and South will be handled in a different (probably bilateral) venue.

VII. The Six Parties will meet again on March 19th for the sixth round of talks.

---

The lack of a firm promise to provide North Korea with a permanent substitute for the energy generated by Yongbyon (i.e. light-water nuclear reactors) and a commitment to continue six-party consultations on larger security issues are the two major differences between today's JS and the Agreed Framework.

These changes definitely reflect the Bush administration's qualitatively different approach to security East Asia and nonproliferation. In terms of East Asia, the U.S. has chosen a position that is long on revisionist rhetoric (shaping China's rise, regime change in North Korea, etc.), but is short on similar policies. The administration's most substantial policy shift in my eyes was Bush solidifying the status quo in the Taiwan Strait back in 2003 by writing off U.S. support for a unilateral declaration of Taiwanese independence. That was a pretty big step away from revisionism for a man who declared the the U.S. will do "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself" in the opening days of his presidency.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the White House is still moving away from the 'hub-and-spoke' model of relations towards East Asia that the U.S. has used to maximize its leverage over Japan, Korea and Taiwan for the past 40 years. Converting the six-party format into a semi-permanent regional security dialogue is a critical first step towards East Asian security integration. One thing is for sure, this certainly wouldn't have been possible with a sino-phobic Rumsfeld still at the helm of the DOD.

The JS is also interesting because it toes the administration's belief that nuclear proliferators should completely abdicate their right to even peaceful, proliferation resistant nuclear technology. Previous administrations have been willing to trade light-water reactors and the Additional Protocol in exchange for dismantlement, but the White House's expandive definition of 'nuclear capability' generally foreclose that route.

This may be practical option for states with minimal nuclear know-how like Iran, but it doesn't seem very practical for North Korea considering that they (kind of) crossed the nuclear threshold last year.

This may all be a moot in few months anyways, considering each party's seeming inability to implement their side of the JS in good faith. Then again, the years I've spent studying Japan, Taiwan and China have given me a pretty cynical view of the East Asian security environment.

In search of the DF-31's spotty record

My analysis of the credibility of the DF-31 in the face of China's recent ASAT has definitely gotten some attention lately. Although Dr. Jeffrey was kind enough to entertain my thoughts, he did voice a legitimate doubt about one of my points:

I wasn’t aware that the booster for the previous tests [in 2002] had been unsuccessful, but if Robot Economist is right … that explains why the DF-31 remains to be deployed.

Now that I look back at my information on the DF-31 tests back in 2002, I am starting to question the veracity of my sources. This all started after I reviewed the DF-31 test timeline prepared by Globalsecurity.org:

Given the evident challenges associated with the DF-31 program, and the variety of operational missiles that are expected to derive from this development effort, it is plausible that there have been a number of flight tests of components associated with the DF-31 prior to an all-up full range test of the complete DF-31 missile.

1. It is reported that the new missile was test-fired for the first time on 29 April 1992. Because of quality problems in its components, the missile exploded after launch.
2. The second launch also failed due to similar problems.
3. Beginning in June 1995 four other missiles were test-fired successfully.
4. A test on 10 November 1995 possibly included endoatmospheric reentry decoys.
5. A test on 10 January 1996 possibly included endoatmospheric reentry decoys.

[snip]

13. In May 2001 it was reported that China was preparing a flight test of the DF-31, with test preparations at the Wuzhai Space and Missile Center in central China having been detected by US intelligence. Some [not particularly credible] reports claim that a newly-formed electronic warfare unit test-fired DF-31 with inputs from "military reconnaissance satellites that cruise above the Taiwan Strait" as part of the "Modern 1" exercise conducted on 28 June 2001.
14. A flight test in January 2002 failed.

Not one to rest on my laurels with this snippet of information, I whipped out LexisNexis and attempted to hunt down the initial reporting on this failed flight test. Among a few 150 word bare-bones wire reports from the BBC World Service on Russian observation of the January test, I came across this article from conservative The Times (of London):

SECTION: WORLD; Pg. 6

LENGTH: 367 words

HEADLINE: Chinese test new missile threat to US shield

BYLINE: Oliver August * Beijing

BODY:

Chinese scientists are close to a breakthrough in rocket technology that would allow Beijing to overcome President Bush's proposed anti-missile shield, American military analysts say.

The People's Liberation Army is believed to be in the final stages of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile with multiple warheads, matching Russian, American and British nuclear technology. One Washington analyst said: "It looks like the Chinese are much further (ahead) than we originally thought."

China's most advanced missiles have a range in excess of 8,000 miles, which puts them within striking distance of the continental United States. Chinese scientists are working on equipping these missiles with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (Mirvs), meaning that the warhead can separate into more than a dozen individual weapons in space.

At present China has around 20 long-range missiles, a number that experts say would allow the American shield to protect against the Chinese arsenal. Washington aims to be able to guard against attacks by rogue states employing up to 24 missiles.

If Beijing upgraded all its missiles with multiple warheads, the analyst said, "it could easily overwhelm the shield. That would change the balance of power in Asia."

US government agencies have followed China's progress in missile technology closely before a decision on the development of the missile shield.

Beijing is said to have stepped up Mirv tests in recent weeks. Earlier this month the Japanese media reported a test flight, during which a Chinese missile completed the first half of its trajectory before disintegrating upon the deployment of the separate warheads.

It was a Dongfeng-31, which has a range of more than 5,000 miles. China is also said to be preparing for a test of the naval version. US intelligence officials are said to have spotted preparations for the test at a Chinese naval port.

Washington first highlighted China's attempt to develop Mirv technology in 1998, when it claimed that Beijing had obtained Russian SS18 missile technology.

The topic is expected to be discussed during President Bush's visit to Beijing next week.

LOAD-DATE: February 12, 2002

I guess I should have known to better than to trust a periodical that has Rupert Murdoch's dirty little fingerprints on it, even a fairly reputable institution like The Times. In order to do this issue true justice, I decided to poke around the Japanese side of the Internet and hunt down an reporting on the January 2002 test.

The first place I looked was the Japanese publication Nuclear Weapon and Nuclear Test Monitor, which is a great Japanese language source on most things nuclear weapons-related. Nestled in their testing log for January-February 2002 is this bullet (page 4):

２月１日　中国が先月、射程約８千キロの「東風（ＤＦ）３１」ミサイルの多弾頭（ＭＩＲＶ）化の為の飛行実験を行ったことを明らかに。実験は失敗。

Translation: February 1 It became apparent last month that China conducted a flight test of a MIRVed version of the 8000 kilometer range DF-31 missile. The test was a failure.

The Japanese are not known for their concision or their directness, I think those are droids I am looking for. There is only one problem: My search options for the Japanese language news are pretty limited, so this is where the trail goes cold - for now. I will look into this again soon, but for now, I need to finish the readings for Mike Mochizuki's class tomorrow or he will be pissed.

Translation: CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes

This is a bit of a puff piece from today's Yomiuri on a recent development in China-Japan-Korea (CJK) relations, but I need more translation practice.

CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes
January 14, 2007

[Cebu (central Philippines)] Prime Minister Abe, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun presented a joint declaration demanding North Korea "take definitive and effective steps towards" nuclear disarmament at 1600 (Tokyo time) from their hotel in Cebu.

The declaration also contained a statement that final negotiations on the "Japan, China and Korea Investment Agreement" concerning the enlargment of investment between the three countries will begin soon.

This is the first summit between Japanese, Chinese and Korean leadership since a suspension two years ago caused by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's contraversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine.

In regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, Prime Minister stressed that "the Six Party Talks are not making substantial progress. It is important for each country to apply an appropriate amount of pressure to urge the North Koreans to make the political decision to denuclearize." President Roh explained that appropriate sanctions included a "suspension of South Korean rice and fertilizer support," while Prime Minister Wen responded that "Six Party talks was a valid process" and that "Japan, China and Korea wanted to cooperatively implement a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

In regard to the abduction issue, Prime Minister Abe stated that "it is regrettable that North Korea is not correspondingly sincere (towards resolving the issue)" and requested Chinese and Korean understanding and cooperation on the matter. Both the Chinese and Korean leaders did not immediately answer, but the joint declaration did reference the abduction issue with a statement that "emphaszied the importance of coping with concerns towards the humanity of all peoples."

The joint declaration also included (1) the establishment of mechanism to allow high-level foreign ministry consultations, (2) a pledge for greater cooperation on environmental issues, including silting and water pollution, and (3) an expression of support for United Nations reform, including reform to the UN Security Council.

The seeming benality of the meeting and joint declaration betrays how tense relations between China, Japan and Korea have been for the last few years. Between Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, some rough times over the gas fields in East China Sea and the protests sparked by Kofi Annan's suggestion that Japan should get a permanent seat on the Security Council, relations between Japan, China and Korea have been frigid. The fact that the three countries haven't had mechanisms to handle working-level diplomatic consultations should speak to how weak relations within the region have been for decades.

I guess now is as good a time as any to start a thaw, now that Shinzo Abe is in power and North Korean missile and nuclear tests have forced Japanese, Chinese and South Korean policy towards Pyongyang as close together as they have ever been.

North Korea to test again?

According to ABC News, Defense officials have pontificated that the North Korea is preparing for another nuclear test. I'm a little suspicious about this myself because as Dr. Jeffery over at ACW points out, Reuters is quoting officials from other corners of the Intelligence Community who think otherwise. I'm not a huge fan of the DIA, so I decided to so look east and see what is percolating in the Japanese press: - The Chunichi Shimbun, Nikkei News, CNN Japan, and (my preferred periodical) Yomiuri Shimbun have all picked on the story, but they all cite the original ABC News piece or 'the American media' more generally as sources. Nothing of interest to report so far. - The Yomiuri has a posted a short wire piece on the Japanese cabinet's official reaction: Second North Korean nuclear test will yield a severe response, Prime Minister tells foreign press January 5, 2007

On the night of January 5th, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe discretely responded to the BBC and Reuters internet wire service from his official residence. According to the Cabinet press office, the Prime Minister stated "(In the event of a precipitous nuclear test) Japan and the interntional community will respond by taking severe measures" in refernce to reports that North Korea is preparing to conduct a repeat of its October 2006 nuclear test. He pointed out that "North Korea is involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The understanding and cooperation of European Union and NATO members in stemming North Korean proliferation has been indispensible. The countries of the world view the kidnapping [ed. of Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s] question as a gross violation of international human rights that must be tackled.

That is pretty hum-drum stuff coming from the occasionally belicose Abe.

Return to Mogadishu and the Japan-Iran connection

The only thing surprising about Ethiopia's campaign to unseat the Islamic Courts Union and install the Transition Federal Government of Somalia is how rapid their advance to Mogadishu has been. I'm pretty surprised that the ICU forces have continued to use the tactics of a conventional army so late into the conflict. It probably would have been smarter for Somali Islamists to have switched to dispersed geurrilla tactics after Ethopian troops crossed the border in serious numbers to reinforce Baidoa back on December 8th. The ICU is just too poorly armed to successfully use conventional tactics against the relatively well-heeled Ethiopian military. As the last paragraphs of the article on the conflict from today's Post suggests:

Witnesses reported seeing a large number of foreign fighters in the convoys heading south. Islamic movement leaders had called on foreign Muslims to join their "holy war" against Ethiopia, which has a majority Christian population. Hundreds were believed to have answered the call. Residents told the AP that Islamic leader Hassan Dahir Aweys had arrived in the frontline town of Jilib, 65 miles north of Kismayo, earlier Thursday with hundreds of fighters aboard 45 pickup trucks mounted with anti-aircraft guns. Islamic fighters have gone door to door in Kismayo recruiting children as young as 12 to make a last stand on behalf of the Islamic movement, according to a U.N. report citing the families of boys taken to Jilib.

Pressing local children into service is an act of desparate act of a group looking towards martyrdom, not one preparing for an insurgency. Did they learn nothing from the defeat and subsequent rebirth of the Taliban in Afghanistan? Massing militiamen just creates larger targets for Ethiopia's Russian-made attack helicopters. For those interested in the Japanese angle on the current flap over Iran's nuclear program, I would definitely suggest giving Michael Penn's "Oil and Power: The Rise and Fall of the Japan-Iran Partnership in Azadegan" a read. Its a quick read covering Japan's involvement in the exploration of Iran's Azadagen oil field and it provides a solid description of how Japan was caught between the bellicose stubbornness of the Bush and Ahmadinejad administrations. Thankfully the Japanese managed to back away from their investments without incurring huge losses, but things did get interesting - at one point the Iranians suggested the Japanese provide technical cooperation to the Iranian nuclear program as a way ensuring it is peaceful.

Translation: Shimane Univ. reprimanded for allowing researcher to buy uranium off the Net

I came across this story while scanning asahi.com today. It is about a Chinese research student at Shimane University (Shimane Prefecture) who was reprimanded for purchasing about 3 grams of yellowcake. The article isn't exactly clear on which uranium oxide it was, but it is probably safe to assume it was the most common form, triuranium oxide. Here is my translation: "Shimane University Researcher Buys Uranium on the Internet, MEXT Issues a Reprimand" December 20, 2006, 9:45pm

"On the 20th of December, Shimane University announced that a former Chinese researcher from its Interdisciplinary Faculty of Science and Engineering purchased 2.8 grams of yellowcake over the Internet from a distributor in the U.S. Under laws policing nuclear materials, the university does have permission to own small quantities (less than 300 grams) for research purposes, but it does not have approval to purchase such material from abroad. Shimane Univerity was reprimanded in a report issued by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). The report also indicated no one has been effected by radiation. [ed. This may seem random, but the Japanese are obsessed with radiation] The MEXT Nuclear Safety Division has never heard of nuclear materials being purchased over the internet before. In September of last year, the Chinese researcher ordered 2.6 grams of yellowcake, 0.128 grams of uranium metal and 0.068 grams of thorium dixode from an American distributor over the internet to use a reference substances for radiometric dating. The materials were delivered in a small, single bundle to a university research lab by a parcel service in June of this year. The triuranium oxide was packed in a test tube in powder form. The millimeter-sized rectangular flecks of uranium and thorium dixode were packed in plastic containers wadded with cotton. In July, the university consulted with MEXT about filing a request for permission to possess the materials, more than half a year after the fact. A panel of outside nuclear experts were brought in to investigate the how and why of the violation because the researcher returned to China last November, two months after the purchase. When contacted, the researcher claimed he was unaware of the laws governing nuclear materials when he made the purchases. According to the MEXT Nuclear Safety Division, countries manage the use and sale of uranium and thorium by issuing liscenses for each transaction. Shimane University is not allowed to make purchases from unliscensed distributors, regardless of whether they are located inside or outside of Japan."

The researcher bought three grams of yellowcake from the U.S. over the internet and left for home without telling anyone. Simply awesome. That probably had to be one of the more surprising FedEx deliveries of 2006. I'm just glad the first successful illegal purchse of radioactive material over the internet on the books was so mundane.

Translation of the Sankei article on the Japanese nuclear industry

Okay, I finally broke down and started my own blog on the various things I bother the good folks at Defensetech.org and the Arms Control Wonk about on a regular basis. That and I need to an excuse to practice my Japanese ahead of an exit exam at GWU in March. To inaugurate this blog, I will have reproduced the rough translation of a December 25th article from the Sankei Shimbun on the Japanese government's recent report on that country's nascent nuclear weapons capacity. Here is the bulk of the item: "Japanese Government Internal Report Says 3-Plus Years and 200-300 Billion Yen to Build Nuke Prototype" December 12, 2006, 2:38am

According to a government report released on the 24th of December, it would take 3-5 years to build a prototype of a miniaturized nuclear warhead. The report “The Domestic Potential for Nuclear Weapons” says that although Japan has the uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities needed, technical limitations would make it difficult to divert them to weapons production. A discussion of revising the first part of Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” has emerged since the North Korean nuclear test the report confirmed the reality that hypothetical Japanese nuclear weapons would be starting from ‘square one.’ The report was proposed on the 20th of September. It went forward after the North Korean nuclear test on the 9th of October. It would take at least 3 years and 200-300 billion yen to mobilize the hundreds of technical needed to build a miniature nuclear warhead prototype. This would be good enough for a hypothetical nuclear-armed Japan to check North Korean nuclear threats alone. The ingredients of nuclear weapons would include uranium for the type of bomb used over Hiroshima or plutonium for the type of bomb used over Nagasaki. The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (Ibaraki Prefecture) and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility (Aomori Prefecture) can do both uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing. However, using their light water reactors will not yield weapons-grade plutonium. Enrichment facilities only manufacture low-enriched uranium that is only enriched to 3% and the facilities frequently experience mechanical problems, so expanding enrichment would be difficult. According to the government report, Japan would have to construct a graphite-moderated breeder reactor and expand its reprocessing facilities to produce enough Pu 239 needed for a nuclear arsenal. It would also be difficult for Japan to miniaturize nuclear warheads because there are many gaps in the technical knowledge required for development.

The results of this report don't really surprise me too much. Sure, Japan has dozens of nuclear power plants with some limited plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment capacity, but it is only enough to support the country's reactor requirements. The large-scale production facilities needed to produce fissile material efficiently can't just be dreamed up over night, even for the technically adroit Japanese.