Showing posts with label Asian Politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asian Politics. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

Is Taiwan's referendum fever bad?

So I've received a few e-mails from concerned readers recently asking about my view of the 'U.N.' referendum situation. Although there was some variation across e-mails, the main thrust of each was essentially: "Now that the U.S. has labelled the referendum a 'mistake,' will Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian go through with it? Is there a chance the Kuomintang will intervene?

The answer to those questions is unfortunately yes and no. President Chen has demonstrated before that he is willing to beat the independence drum to garner votes from the activist wing of his Democratic Progressive Party, even when such actions only wound the cross-strait relationship further. It appears that the DPP leadership will continue to embrace this tactic, as evidenced by the party platform they recently crafted for the 2008 elections.

In terms of KMT intervention, the situation is far more complex. The members of the panel charged with implementing referendum questions are apportioned according to party representation in the Legislative Yuan. Since the KMT leads a coalition that has a legislative majority, they have an procedural veto. They have already used this veto to throw out a more inflammatory referendum question about whether the nation should seek U.N. membership under the name 'Taiwan.'

The problem is that pursuing membership in international organizations, particularly those that do not require de jure sovereignty, is quite popular. KMT leaders understand that they can't not put that issue to a vote now that it has been raise by the DPP. As a result, they moved to water down the language of the referendum question. It currently reads:

Do you agree on Taiwan's using a practical and flexible name to apply for reentering the U.N. as well as joining other international organizations? In other words, do you agree on Taiwan applying for reentering the U.N. and other international organizations under the name of Republic of China, Taiwan, or any other name that would be helpful both to the U.N. bid and to maintaining Taiwan's dignity?

The only way to make that question any more confusing is to offer voters a 'GTFO' option in addition to the more traditional 'Yes' and 'No' choices.

This watered down language will temporarily inflame nationalism on the mainland, strain relations with the United States and increase the political divide between pan-Green and pan-Blue. With a bit of luck, it will only take a few months for the Taiwan situation will drift back into the equilibrium it has occupied off-and-on since 2000.

In the meantime, grey hairs will continue to proliferate at that Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs as things ramp up to the vote in March.

Tuesday, July 17, 2007

Getting old before getting rich?

I apologize for pushing my promised C4ISR article off, but I received some questions from Chris M. about demographics, development and China:

I have a question that I would like to run by an actual East Asian specialist. Much is made about how China will be the new world power- the one to replace the US. I just don't see how it is possible. China is in a demographic coffin corner and in 50 years they are going to be totally screwed. Look at the age/sex curve projected by the Census bureau for 2050. Sure, in 2050 they will have 70+ million young males of military age, but they are going to have 450 million people 60+ (they are going to have a population 60+ larger than the entire US!). How can an economy grow, a country afford a military (especially the opportunity cost of those productive young males), and the country be expected to do anything with that much population that old? Short of inventing robots to take care of all those old folks, who will? Indonesians? Who will pay for all of this? Their ratio of workers to 60+ people will be less than 2:1. That will be a severe problem, right?

What happens when a country that is somewhat poor per capita, but has a pretty industrialized economy, goes gray really rapidly? The closest I can think of is Russia and some of the old Communist countries, who have aged tremendously in the past 15 years, but isn't a lot of that due to immigration and economic distress, not totally broken birth rates (leaving the huge sex-ratio disparity in the PRC completely out of the picture)? We also can see what happens when a rich country (per capita) grays- we have Japan and Western Europe to show us the way, but I can't think of a good model for this sort of thing. They would have to fix a lot of problems in their universal education system to be able to follow the path that Japan and Western Europe are blazing.

No one who predicts that China is the coming threat to the US, or that China will soon be the world's economic engine seems to ever mention this problem. Why is that? Am I missing something that people who have actually studied the issue understand? I'm somewhat afraid that this is a kooky position, as I haven't seen it discussed in the popular press.

In answer to your first question - yes, the Census Bureau's figures on Chinese population growth should be considered a fairly accurate prediction of the future. Their country summary shows that Chinese fertility rates are well under the replacement rate. The projections show that China's population growth rate will go negative around 2035, which means their total population will peak at about 1.46 billion. By all accounts, Russia's total population peaked around 1995, Italy and Japan's peaked around 2005. In fact, if you look at the Global Population at a Glance report the Census Bureau issued in 2002, the human population growth rate peaked somewhere around 2000 and the mean global fertility rate is expected to drop below the replacement rate around 2050.

Now we get to the question, "So what does this mean for China?" Before I answer that, I want to dispel the myth that population aging is always a bad thing. Declines in population growth over time will push a country's demographic composition away from a traditional pyramid shape to something more akin to a paper lantern.

Chris is right to point out that this means this will tip the population balance away from the young toward the old, but it doesn't say much about who will work. Japan and Europe have been pretty lucky because they were able to transition their economies from manufacturing towards services, which is far more friendly to older workers. Older workers are generally better at service jobs because their experience and knowledge generally adds the most value. Service jobs are also less physically intense, which allows older workers to stay on the job longer.

This does not come without cost though. Older workers require a higher degree of medical attention and at some point that cost will outweigh their contribution to the economy. This will be particularly problematic if the inflationary trend in the price of medical care in the United States -- 7.9% in 2004 according to the Economist (sorry, subscription only) -- spreads to other countries. All is not lost though because there are two effects that may mitigate the medical care crunch Chris sees over the horizon. First, older workers save more because they don't have to care children. Second, spending on health care generates fairly high margin service jobs.

The key question is, can China fill those jobs? Maybe. The Chinese economic miracle is largely predicated on a delicate balance of fertility, development and migration. The reasonably well-educated middle class that has grown in coastal provinces would not be able to meet demand without the constant flow of unskilled workers from China's interior.

If migration slows down before the Chinese economy moves further up the product life cycle, growth may come to a screeching halt. China could mitigate this by accepting greater flows of immigrants from the poorer states of Southeast Asia (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma, etc.), but it is not clear whether they would make such a dramatic policy shift before the foreign direct investment starts flowing somewhere else.

This structural movement is certainly possible. The Japanese and Europeans pulled it off in the 1950s-1960s and the Asian tigers did the same in the 1970s-1980s. So the take-home message on this subject is that population decline could seriously derail its economy, but shouldn't if the Chinese manage it correctly.

As for what things will look like after 2050, I don't know. At that point, the predictions of statisticians and economists are about as certain as fiction novels on the subject. One thing is for sure, China will probably have to get a lot more comfortable with accepting immigrants from the last few high fertility spots in the world (Africa, South Asia and the Near East).

The real question is what will happen to Russia. It looks like the boom in commodity prices and Russia's shrinking population are turning it into a full-blown rentier state. There are definitely indications that the Dutch disease's 'spending effect' is hollowing out parts of the Russian economy.

Sunday, March 25, 2007

"World's quietest taxpayer"

I hate to get too japanophile for my American readers, but I came across this interesting music video for DJ OASIS's song "The World's Quietest Taxpayer" (featuring rap lyricist Utamaru). The lyrics to the song are a pretty strong indictment of Japanese politics, but the video tops it off with a show trial for former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Whoever says that Japanese youth are more militaristic than their parents or grandparents clearly hasn't spent any time hanging out with them.

Check out DJ OASIS's English myspace page. Its pretty obnoxious.

Thursday, February 22, 2007

Chris Hill: 'Initial Actions' is 'Six Million Dollar Man,' not 'Back to the Future'

The U.S.'s lead negotiator at the Six Party Talks, Christopher Hill gave a speech at the Brookings Institution today defending the Initial Actions for Implementation of the Joint Statement issued earlier this month. Some in the disarmament community, including yours truly, snarked at the statement for being largely a carbon copy of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Bush administration walked away from the Agreed Framework pretty casually around 2002, citing intelligence on North Korean efforts to covertly enrich uranium.

I've always seen that move as somewhat of a draw for both sides. The U.S. was right to criticize the North Koreans for their subterfuge, but the North Koreans didn't essentially violate their commitments. In fact, the Agreed Framework does not even mention the words "uranium" or "enrichment." You could make the case that the North Koreans violated their safeguards agreement, which was one of the final provisions of the agreement. Indeed, the uranium enrichment issue continues to be a huge complicating factor for negotiations as Hill's comments today indicate:

Of course, in this discussion, we will face the problem, in fact, the very serious problem of the highly enriched uranium program. We have information, and I have seen the information – a number of countries have seen the information – that the DPRK, the North Koreans, made certain purchases of equipment which is entirely consistent with a highly enriched uranium program.

Of course, it is a complex program. It would require a lot more equipment than we know that they have actually purchased. It requires some production techniques, some considerable production techniques that we are not sure whether they have mastered those. But, certainly, we need to have a discussion about where they are on this because we need some explanation of what was purchased. For example, we know that they attempted to purchase some aluminum tubes from Germany. In fact, there was a court case with respect to these aluminum tubes. We have some indications that they were successful in getting some of these tubes elsewhere. By the way, these are tubes that we know have the fit, the type of Pakistani designed centrifuges that we know they have also which we know from Pakistani sources that they have also procured.

So at some point, we need to see what has happened to this equipment. If the tubes did not go into a highly enriched uranium program, maybe they went somewhere else, fine. We can have a discussion about where they are and where they have gone.

I have raised the issue of highly enriched uranium with the North Koreans on just about every occasion we have met with them, certainly on all the Six-Party meetings, and we have agreed that we can discuss this. I want to make very clear, though, the North Koreans have not acknowledged having an HEU program. They have not acknowledged that, but they have been willing to discuss what we know and to try to resolve this to mutual satisfaction. We don’t know whether we are going to be able to do that, but we have agreed to have this discussion.

Jeez, it looks like Pakistani centrifuges are pretty popular these days. What happens when Paris Hilton buys one, covers it in diamonds and then takes it out to a club with Britney and Lindsay Lohan? Seriously though, the Bush administration's tough approach on North Korea's enrichment program was bound to fail because it is nearly impossible to pressure a state that you already threaten with massive retaliation. How the U.S. raise the stakes? Blow Pyongyang up twice?

In the administration's defense, they did manage to shut down North Korea's counterfeiting operations in Macao. I'm slightly dubious of the legality of this move, but I will save that for a later post.

Anyways, Hill makes the case that the Initial Actions where not just Back to the Future, but instead, something more akin to the Six Million Dollar Man ('Gentlemen, we can rebuild him... Better than he was before. Better…stronger…faster.'). I've excerpted some of his key points:

In addition to our bilateral talk, there is also envisioned a Japanese-North Korean bilateral negotiation, and here too there are some issues that are especially very important on the Japanese side, issues for which the Japanese Government and, frankly, the Japanese people need some closure. Most importantly, from Japan’s point of view is, of course, the issue of abductions. And so, this has to be addressed. We are not expecting this problem to be resolved immediately, but certainly there needs to be a mechanism that Japan and North Korea can agreed on to address these issues.

Again, it is not going to be easy, but it clearly is a very important issue, especially important issue from the point of view of the Japanese public. The families of people who were abducted for various purposes 25 years ago, they need some clarity on what happened. As Japan and North Korea sit down together to address the prospects of normalizing their relationship, they are going to have to deal with these outstanding issues of concern.

Yes, the Japanese are an intensely idiosyncratic people. Yes, they do indeed find the abduction of potentially less than 100 Japanese citizens back in the late 1970s and early 1980s more important than the North Korean nuclear issue. The fact of the matter is that Shinzo Abe has staked the viability of his government on resolving this issue. If all it takes to keep Japan on message during the Six Party Talks is making sure Japan gets to air its relatively minor issue (in terms of regional security), then so be it.

In addition, finally, there will be a working group to discuss some of the future relationships that we would hope to address, that is, future relationships in the overall region. And so, we are looking at having a working group to begin to chart out how a Northeast Asia peace and security working group can look at overall problems in the region and can look ahead to see how we can begin or to strengthen multilateral processes in the region.

I have said on many occasions, and I strongly believe that Northeast Asia is truly one of the most exciting and successful parts of the world, and yet there should be a greater sense of and greater development of multilateral institutions. We hope that the Six-Party process can be a kind of embryonic structure, that if we can get through this very difficult task in front of us, that is, the denuclearization task, it can move on and do some other tasks.

Often, people in Northeast Asia say, well, you have no idea the difficult history we have had in Northeast Asia. Well, we do have an idea of the difficult history Northeast Asia has. By the way, there are other parts of the world that have also had very difficult histories, and I must say Europe comes to mind. When you look at what has been done in Europe in terms of multilateral structures, it is truly impressive, and I think it is an inspiration to those of us in North America but also should be an inspiration to Northeast Asia. So we would like to do some more on these things.

As I mentioned in my initial assessment, the 'Initial Actions' take the huge step of setting the stage for a permanent multilateral security dialogue for Northeast Asia. Although this dialogue won't essentially turn into a new regional security order over night (or possibly even at all), it does represent a shift away from traditional U.S. policy.

This clear signal is all the more ironic considering the second report on the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance issued by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye was also released this month. Their first report essentially advocated changing the U.S.-Japanese alliance to mirror the U.S.'s relationship with the United Kingdom. Needless to say, it was not well received by Japanese scholars or politicians. Their second report scales things back a bit and focuses on building an 'open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values.' The report also suggests turning out the alliance like a Bangkok hooker on a Saturday night in order to promote trilateral cooperation with all of the usual johns: China, India, Australia, ASEAN, APEC, etc. It also advocates using the alliance as the basis for common policy towards the tense situations on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.

I guess I have bored my non-Asia specialist readers with enough policy chatter for now. I'll make it up to you by posting something cool, I promise.

Tuesday, February 13, 2007

Blast from the Past: Latest 6-P Talks joint statement

I just read the latest joint statement agreeded to by the six parties (China, Russia, Japan, the U.S. and North and South Korea) and I almost cried. Not out of elation or sadness, but because it reminded me so much of the 1994 Agreed Framework and 1994 always makes me think about the death of Kurt Cobain. Here is a summary of today's statement:


I. The Six Parties reaffirm their intention to implementing the September 2005 joint statement in a 'step-by-step' fashion. (see this ACW post for a good description of how Joe Rood's unilateral reinterpertation of U.S. commitments in the 2005 JS caused implementation to fall apart before it even began)

II.

1) North Korea will power down and seal the graphite-moderated Magnox reactor at Yongbyon.

2) North Korea will disclose all of its nuclear activities.

3) The U.S. and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including consideration of taking Pyongyang off the state-sponsors of terror list and easing some unilateral sanctions.

4) Japan and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including North Korean grievances originating from the Japanese occupation and the status of the Japanese citizens kidnapped by the Norks back in the 70s (not explicitly stated, but definitely in the subtext).

5) Reaffirms the first three clauses of the JS issued two years ago. This includes commitments to normalizing relations all around, an affirmation that U.S. nuclear weapons are off the Korean peninsula and will not return and commitments to provide energy aid to Pyongyang.

III. The Six Parties will establish working groups on Korean denulearization, energy assistance to the North, the normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo/Washington and a East Asian 'peace and security' mechanism.

IV. The North Koreans will receive up to 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (with an initial shipment of 50,000 tons) once they declare and begin dismantling their nuclear program.

V. The Six Parties agree to future ministerial meetings to monitor implementation and explore other subjects to promote 'peace and security' in East Asia.

VI. The Six Parties will work to build mutual trust and peace in the region. Peace between the North and South will be handled in a different (probably bilateral) venue.

VII. The Six Parties will meet again on March 19th for the sixth round of talks.


The lack of a firm promise to provide North Korea with a permanent substitute for the energy generated by Yongbyon (i.e. light-water nuclear reactors) and a commitment to continue six-party consultations on larger security issues are the two major differences between today's JS and the Agreed Framework.

These changes definitely reflect the Bush administration's qualitatively different approach to security East Asia and nonproliferation. In terms of East Asia, the U.S. has chosen a position that is long on revisionist rhetoric (shaping China's rise, regime change in North Korea, etc.), but is short on similar policies. The administration's most substantial policy shift in my eyes was Bush solidifying the status quo in the Taiwan Strait back in 2003 by writing off U.S. support for a unilateral declaration of Taiwanese independence. That was a pretty big step away from revisionism for a man who declared the the U.S. will do "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself" in the opening days of his presidency.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the White House is still moving away from the 'hub-and-spoke' model of relations towards East Asia that the U.S. has used to maximize its leverage over Japan, Korea and Taiwan for the past 40 years. Converting the six-party format into a semi-permanent regional security dialogue is a critical first step towards East Asian security integration. One thing is for sure, this certainly wouldn't have been possible with a sino-phobic Rumsfeld still at the helm of the DOD.

The JS is also interesting because it toes the administration's belief that nuclear proliferators should completely abdicate their right to even peaceful, proliferation resistant nuclear technology. Previous administrations have been willing to trade light-water reactors and the Additional Protocol in exchange for dismantlement, but the White House's expandive definition of 'nuclear capability' generally foreclose that route.

This may be practical option for states with minimal nuclear know-how like Iran, but it doesn't seem very practical for North Korea considering that they (kind of) crossed the nuclear threshold last year.

This may all be a moot in few months anyways, considering each party's seeming inability to implement their side of the JS in good faith. Then again, the years I've spent studying Japan, Taiwan and China have given me a pretty cynical view of the East Asian security environment.

Tuesday, January 23, 2007

Hu's in charge?

I've been sitting on this post for a while now, but I thought my two cents might be of interest:

The New York Times ran a piece yesterday questioning whether the Politburo of the People's Republic of China had complete control over this month's ASAT test:

The American officials presume that Mr. Hu was generally aware of the missile testing program, but speculate that he may not have known the timing of the test. China’s continuing silence would appear to suggest, at a minimum, that Mr. Hu did not anticipate a strong international reaction, either because he had not fully prepared for the possibility that the test would succeed, or because he did not foresee that American intelligence on it would be shared with allies, or leaked.

In an interview late Friday, Stephen J. Hadley, President Bush’s national security adviser, raised the possibility that China’s leaders might not have fully known what their military was doing.

I think Mr. Hadley needs a lesson in comparative politics. In some countries around the world, political power is not clearly defined by the national constitution or laws. China, for example, is a corporatist state run by different political cliques that are born from personal relationships, patronage networks and common economic interests. These cliques are constantly jockeying for position within the state (and party, in this case). Needless, performance is a large determinant of the length of a Chinese politician's career.

Excuse the acerbic comment, but I doubt the Chinese premiere would be allowed to blunder into a hornet's nest like Iraq and keep his job for a year, let alone four. I'm also skeptical of Hadley's view because Hu Jintao has a very close relationship with the head of China's Second Artillery Corps. The Corps' current commander, Lieutenant-General Jing Zhiyuan owes both his third star and his position on China's Central Military Commission to Hu. If you want to know more about the dynamics of the current CMC, check out this article in the Asia Times article written just after Hu wrested the commission from his predecessor Jiang Zemin.

The Times article continues and produces an alternative answer to China's silence that is far more likely:

Chinese political and military analysts, who would not speak on the record about an issue the Chinese government still regards as secret, said they considered it unlikely that the army’s Second Artillery forces, in charge of its ballistic missiles, would conduct a test of a sophisticated new weapon without approval from the highest levels.

But they suggested that the test might have been approved in principle, with little advance preparation for the diplomatic fallout in the event it was successful. That entails not just new military worries; the destruction of the weather satellite left debris in space that could damage satellites from other nations.

“It’s the kind of silence that makes you wonder what’s happening inside the country,” said another senior American official who has been monitoring the case. “I’m sure the Chinese leadership knew there were tests under way, in a general sort of way. But they don’t seem to have been prepared for a success, and they clearly had not thought about what they would say to the world.”

I think the unnamed political military analysts may be on to the most likely cause of China's public silence - a failure to coordinate information between the military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

We are talking about a government whose budget documents are treated like state secrets, so I wouldn't be surprised if the military held the details of their test too close. It is quite possible that Hu and his politburo associates just assumed briefing packages on the test would change hands at the right time and paid the matter no mind.

I can think of two more plausible explanations, although there are plenty of possible explanations:

1) As my recent research into a DF-31 test has shown, the Chinese military isn't known for being forthcoming when it comes to its missile activities. It is possible that they didn't even think of how the test would impact international politics and security relationships.

2) The Chinese military calculated that the damage done by a failed, but publicly announced test would outweigh the impact of international outrage at an successful unannounced test.

Either way, I think Mr. Hu has enough tact and political savvy to know that his government's initial silence and bungled reaction have tarnished their 'peaceful rise' tag line.

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Translation: CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes

This is a bit of a puff piece from today's Yomiuri on a recent development in China-Japan-Korea (CJK) relations, but I need more translation practice.

CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes
January 14, 2007

[Cebu (central Philippines)] Prime Minister Abe, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun presented a joint declaration demanding North Korea "take definitive and effective steps towards" nuclear disarmament at 1600 (Tokyo time) from their hotel in Cebu.

The declaration also contained a statement that final negotiations on the "Japan, China and Korea Investment Agreement" concerning the enlargment of investment between the three countries will begin soon.

This is the first summit between Japanese, Chinese and Korean leadership since a suspension two years ago caused by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's contraversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine.

In regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, Prime Minister stressed that "the Six Party Talks are not making substantial progress. It is important for each country to apply an appropriate amount of pressure to urge the North Koreans to make the political decision to denuclearize." President Roh explained that appropriate sanctions included a "suspension of South Korean rice and fertilizer support," while Prime Minister Wen responded that "Six Party talks was a valid process" and that "Japan, China and Korea wanted to cooperatively implement a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

In regard to the abduction issue, Prime Minister Abe stated that "it is regrettable that North Korea is not correspondingly sincere (towards resolving the issue)" and requested Chinese and Korean understanding and cooperation on the matter. Both the Chinese and Korean leaders did not immediately answer, but the joint declaration did reference the abduction issue with a statement that "emphaszied the importance of coping with concerns towards the humanity of all peoples."

The joint declaration also included (1) the establishment of mechanism to allow high-level foreign ministry consultations, (2) a pledge for greater cooperation on environmental issues, including silting and water pollution, and (3) an expression of support for United Nations reform, including reform to the UN Security Council.

The seeming benality of the meeting and joint declaration betrays how tense relations between China, Japan and Korea have been for the last few years. Between Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, some rough times over the gas fields in East China Sea and the protests sparked by Kofi Annan's suggestion that Japan should get a permanent seat on the Security Council, relations between Japan, China and Korea have been frigid. The fact that the three countries haven't had mechanisms to handle working-level diplomatic consultations should speak to how weak relations within the region have been for decades.

I guess now is as good a time as any to start a thaw, now that Shinzo Abe is in power and North Korean missile and nuclear tests have forced Japanese, Chinese and South Korean policy towards Pyongyang as close together as they have ever been.