Showing posts with label Those Crazy Norks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Those Crazy Norks. Show all posts

Friday, July 6, 2007

Taepodong 2 = complete failure?

I've been mediating on the judgements made by the Japanese Ministry of Defense report in the article I translated on Tuesday. I agree with their view and here is my logic:

North Korean missile designers are resourceful, but their current string of designs lack originality. They nailed down the R-11 'Scud' design in the 1980s and have been producing it domestically for ever since. The North Koreans have even made a modest income exporting Scuds that have been modified to extend their range. The medium-range No Dong is often credited as an indigenous North Korean design, but most accounts of No-Dong development either describe it as a scaled-up Scud or a modified version of the ancient R-13 'Sark' submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Either way, North Korean engineers can only squeeze so much more additional range out by lengthening the missile and shaving down the payload.

This brings us to the Taepodong-1, North Korea's first attempt at building a multi-stage missile. The Taepodong-1's design is familiar enough -- a modified Scud-B affixed to the top of a No Dong missile. The only new component is a small, solid-fueled third stage (maybe an KN-02?) situated on top of the Scud B. When the North Koreans attempted to launch the Taepodong-1 back in August 1998, the first and second stages appear to have worked, but third stage did not.

The Taepodong-2 also represents a relatively bold step away from the previous incrementalism of the North Korean missile program. Not only that, it appears to be very different from its similarly named cousin. The Taepodong-2 launch last July appeared to be a two-stage missile -- a No Dong missile fixed to the top of what may have been first stage of a DF-3A. Whatever the first stage was, it probably need to go back to the drawing board because it flamed out after only 40 seconds of burn time last year.

Based on this track record, I feel pretty sanguine about the prospect of vertical missile proliferation in North Korea. Pyongyang's best brains were only able to crack the Scud formula after decades of incremental reverse-engineering (and probably a fair amount of trial and error). Attempts to incorporate new technology appear to be consistently (forgive the pun) blowing up in their faces. This gives me a pretty strong impression that we should be far more worried about North Korea's nuclear scientists than their missile engineers.

Tuesday, July 3, 2007

Translation: "Taepodong 2 drops off the coast of North Korea, 400 kilometers --> dozens of kilometers, complete failure"

Dr. J over at the ArmsControlWonk asked me to run down the Mainichi Shimbun article referenced in the first paragraph of AFP story from July 30, 2006. By the power of Greyskull and the wonder of Dow Jones's Factiva, I managed to track it down and the following rough translation (the original Japanese text has been attached to the comments section):

"Taepodong 2 drops off the coast of North Korea, 400 kilometers --> dozens of kilometers, complete failure"

* No Dong 2 and Scud 4 also tested -- Japanese Defense Agency report.

July 30, 2006

By Akitaka Furuhon

The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) released an outline of a reconnaissance report concerning high-profile ballistic missile tests conducted in the vicinity of North Korea on July 29. Of the seven missiles tested, it concludes that the third missile, which has specifically classified as the two-stage Taepodong 2, was a complete failure. The 400 kilometer flight path estimated was revised to read "Only a few dozen miles off of the coast in North Korean waters." Of the remaining six missiles, report concluded that two were "No Dongs" and four where "Scuds."

The July report was the result of the JDA reconciling early information like missile trajectories seen by the Marine Self-Defense Forces' Aegis cruiser radars with later data from the U.S. military's ground-based radar.

The Taepodong 2 missile was launched from Musudanri in northeastern North Korean. Its first stage is newly designed booster and its second stage is a Nodong missile. At first, the missile appeared to have dropped into the ocean 350 kilometers north-north west of the coast of Niigata prefecture, which would have been a distance of 400 kilometers. The result of several data analyses, however, revised this distance based on the conclusion that the first stage burned out after 40 seconds and the second stage did not separate. The observed burn time of less than three minutes under normal operating conditions leads to the conclusion that test was a complete failure.

On the one hand, the report said "the probability that the missile's target was the Pacific Ocean is high," but it avoided specifics because the launch was far from normal.

The remaining six missiles were launched towards the northeast from Kittaeryong in southeastern North Korea and they were seen falling into the ocean about 400 miles away. The missile trajectories were not tracked long enough for accurate analysis, but the report ends it analysis by stating "the six launched missiles fell within dozens of kilometers of their range" without providing the actual impact sites.

Using the six missile's initial velocity and burn pattern, two were classified as No Dongs and the four others were classified as Scuds. Based on the trajectory analysis, the report judges that a new IRBM (Editor's Note: the Japanese author translates the acronym IRBM to 'submarine-launched medium range missile' -- like the Norks have subs large enough) currently in development was not included in the tests. The report does offer some minor specifics on the Scuds and ends with the observation that "it is possible that a new Scud design was included among the missiles tested."

(Editors's note: I am not very confident about my take on this next sentence) In regards to the launch procedures used by North Korea, Japanese and American intelligence agencies are waiting to see whether the tests are proclaimed a demonstration of North Korean power. The report also does not draw conclusions on North Korea's intent.

(Update: MTC was kind enough to translate the last paragraph correctly. By misinterpreting the meaning of "打ち上げ順序," I screwed the whole paragraph up -- my bad.)

As for the order of the missile firings, the intelligence agencies of both the U.S. and Japan have said, "It is really not in our best interest to reveal our capabilities." They defer on making a public statement. They will also not be confirming in a published report the mappings out of any of the missile firings.

Interesting stuff. Let me know what you think -- I'm going to weigh in on it sometime tomorrow.

Friday, March 30, 2007

Nonproliferation LOLs - 30 March 2007

Paul K. pulled out a great quote related to the North Korean nuclear situation out of Wednesday's Choson Ilbo:

When North Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan met his U.S. counterpart Christopher Hill in New York on March 5, a source familiar with U.S.-North Korean relations says, Kim asked Hill to “treat us the way you treat India.”

lol.

No, seriously - I feel for Chris Hill, I really do. He's the guy who has to negotiate an nuclear arms control agreement on behalf of an administration that doesn't believe in arms control and is preparing for a more proliferated world. That kind of job clearly falls into the 'sucks' category.

Friday, March 2, 2007

Items of Interest

Between writing endless read-aheads, glad-handing foreign military officials or praticing my Japanese in preparation for next week's language exit exam at GWU, I have been pretty busy. Instead of forgetting all of the neat ideas for a blog post that pop into my mind throughout the day, I've taken down to writing brief notes. Here are a few items of interest for my dear readers:

Counterterrorism Policy by Schwarzenegger

Unfortunately, California's governor has not penned his own counterterrorism policy. Yet. A fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution named Thomas Henrikson did in the February/March issue of Policy Review and it looks a lot like something straight out of Commando. His "Security Lessons from the Israeli Trenches" lauds Israel's aggressive, muscular approach to stopping terrorism including some of its more contraversial aspects, such as targeted assassinations, building 'buffer zones' on foreign soil and urban commando raids.

I don't mean to sound like a dove here, but I think the key flaw of Henrikson's thesis is that he measures success by relative body count. His article makes a key error that I think the Israeli security establishment has made since the 1970s, namely the pursuit of short-term survival over ending the attacks in the long-term. Even the Israelis have an excuse for missing this issue because dealing with constant violence along its periphery can be taxing for leaders and bureaucracies.

Henrikson, however, does not have excuse for missing the big picture, which is probably why he is stuck in an Ivory tower for conservative scholars like the Hoover Institution.

Kim Jung Il seyz: "The only thing spinnin' be the rims on my Escalade"

It turns out that the Norks might not have a gas centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program after all. Of course, if you read ArmsControlWonk, you'd know that the Arms Control Association's Paul Kerr was digging up the same info two years ago. This in itself should be nothing new because Kerr has a pretty solid track record for getting inside the mainstream media's OODA loop on nuclear proliferation issues.

Reliable Replacement Warhead contract issued

Yep, its true. One of the most God foresaken politically-driven decisions regarding the critically sensitive area of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is actually going to happen:

The design team from NNSA's Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories was selected to develop the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). NNSA and the national laboratories have determined that this design can be certified without requiring underground nuclear testing.

[Snip]

Teams from NNSA's Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories partnered with Sandia National Laboratories to submit design proposals to the NWC. In late 2006, the NWC evaluated the proposals and determined that the RRW concept was feasible to sustain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.

"Both teams developed brilliant designs," said D'Agostino. "Because of the superior science across the nuclear weapons complex with assets like supercomputers, and the early design engagement with the production facilities, the laboratories were able to develop designs in nine months that were much more mature than they would have been after two years of work during the Cold War. This is an amazing scientific accomplishment that should not be overlooked."

The two nuclear weapons laboratories both submitted designs that fully met all RRW requirements. However, D'Agostino noted that higher confidence in the ability to certify the Livermore design without underground nuclear testing was the primary reason for its selection. That design was more closely tied to previous underground testing. While one of several factors, it was an especially important one to assure long-term confidence in the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Several features of the Los Alamos design are highly innovative and will be developed in parallel with the Livermore effort. As they mature, the features may be introduced into the RRW design as it progresses.

Ouch. Talk about a "Dear John" letter for Los Alamos National Laboratories. It originally looked like Congress might buy into two RRWs just to keep both laboratories alive. Then the Bush administration toyed with the idea of a hybrid bomb that would combine technology from Lawrence Livermore's design, which was tested back in the 1980s, and Los Alamos's brand new design. Now it appears that the Bush administration has come to grips with the fact that it can't afford to keep two nuclear weapons laboratories on life support.

The Los Alamos insider's blog LANL: The Corporate Story (successor to LANL: The Real Story) believes that this announcement is the laboratory's death knell. Unless Pete Domineci can defend LANL by slipping a consolation prize into this year's enormous Defense appropriations bill, I think they may be right.

Thursday, February 22, 2007

Chris Hill: 'Initial Actions' is 'Six Million Dollar Man,' not 'Back to the Future'

The U.S.'s lead negotiator at the Six Party Talks, Christopher Hill gave a speech at the Brookings Institution today defending the Initial Actions for Implementation of the Joint Statement issued earlier this month. Some in the disarmament community, including yours truly, snarked at the statement for being largely a carbon copy of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Bush administration walked away from the Agreed Framework pretty casually around 2002, citing intelligence on North Korean efforts to covertly enrich uranium.

I've always seen that move as somewhat of a draw for both sides. The U.S. was right to criticize the North Koreans for their subterfuge, but the North Koreans didn't essentially violate their commitments. In fact, the Agreed Framework does not even mention the words "uranium" or "enrichment." You could make the case that the North Koreans violated their safeguards agreement, which was one of the final provisions of the agreement. Indeed, the uranium enrichment issue continues to be a huge complicating factor for negotiations as Hill's comments today indicate:

Of course, in this discussion, we will face the problem, in fact, the very serious problem of the highly enriched uranium program. We have information, and I have seen the information – a number of countries have seen the information – that the DPRK, the North Koreans, made certain purchases of equipment which is entirely consistent with a highly enriched uranium program.

Of course, it is a complex program. It would require a lot more equipment than we know that they have actually purchased. It requires some production techniques, some considerable production techniques that we are not sure whether they have mastered those. But, certainly, we need to have a discussion about where they are on this because we need some explanation of what was purchased. For example, we know that they attempted to purchase some aluminum tubes from Germany. In fact, there was a court case with respect to these aluminum tubes. We have some indications that they were successful in getting some of these tubes elsewhere. By the way, these are tubes that we know have the fit, the type of Pakistani designed centrifuges that we know they have also which we know from Pakistani sources that they have also procured.

So at some point, we need to see what has happened to this equipment. If the tubes did not go into a highly enriched uranium program, maybe they went somewhere else, fine. We can have a discussion about where they are and where they have gone.

I have raised the issue of highly enriched uranium with the North Koreans on just about every occasion we have met with them, certainly on all the Six-Party meetings, and we have agreed that we can discuss this. I want to make very clear, though, the North Koreans have not acknowledged having an HEU program. They have not acknowledged that, but they have been willing to discuss what we know and to try to resolve this to mutual satisfaction. We don’t know whether we are going to be able to do that, but we have agreed to have this discussion.

Jeez, it looks like Pakistani centrifuges are pretty popular these days. What happens when Paris Hilton buys one, covers it in diamonds and then takes it out to a club with Britney and Lindsay Lohan? Seriously though, the Bush administration's tough approach on North Korea's enrichment program was bound to fail because it is nearly impossible to pressure a state that you already threaten with massive retaliation. How the U.S. raise the stakes? Blow Pyongyang up twice?

In the administration's defense, they did manage to shut down North Korea's counterfeiting operations in Macao. I'm slightly dubious of the legality of this move, but I will save that for a later post.

Anyways, Hill makes the case that the Initial Actions where not just Back to the Future, but instead, something more akin to the Six Million Dollar Man ('Gentlemen, we can rebuild him... Better than he was before. Better…stronger…faster.'). I've excerpted some of his key points:

In addition to our bilateral talk, there is also envisioned a Japanese-North Korean bilateral negotiation, and here too there are some issues that are especially very important on the Japanese side, issues for which the Japanese Government and, frankly, the Japanese people need some closure. Most importantly, from Japan’s point of view is, of course, the issue of abductions. And so, this has to be addressed. We are not expecting this problem to be resolved immediately, but certainly there needs to be a mechanism that Japan and North Korea can agreed on to address these issues.

Again, it is not going to be easy, but it clearly is a very important issue, especially important issue from the point of view of the Japanese public. The families of people who were abducted for various purposes 25 years ago, they need some clarity on what happened. As Japan and North Korea sit down together to address the prospects of normalizing their relationship, they are going to have to deal with these outstanding issues of concern.

Yes, the Japanese are an intensely idiosyncratic people. Yes, they do indeed find the abduction of potentially less than 100 Japanese citizens back in the late 1970s and early 1980s more important than the North Korean nuclear issue. The fact of the matter is that Shinzo Abe has staked the viability of his government on resolving this issue. If all it takes to keep Japan on message during the Six Party Talks is making sure Japan gets to air its relatively minor issue (in terms of regional security), then so be it.

In addition, finally, there will be a working group to discuss some of the future relationships that we would hope to address, that is, future relationships in the overall region. And so, we are looking at having a working group to begin to chart out how a Northeast Asia peace and security working group can look at overall problems in the region and can look ahead to see how we can begin or to strengthen multilateral processes in the region.

I have said on many occasions, and I strongly believe that Northeast Asia is truly one of the most exciting and successful parts of the world, and yet there should be a greater sense of and greater development of multilateral institutions. We hope that the Six-Party process can be a kind of embryonic structure, that if we can get through this very difficult task in front of us, that is, the denuclearization task, it can move on and do some other tasks.

Often, people in Northeast Asia say, well, you have no idea the difficult history we have had in Northeast Asia. Well, we do have an idea of the difficult history Northeast Asia has. By the way, there are other parts of the world that have also had very difficult histories, and I must say Europe comes to mind. When you look at what has been done in Europe in terms of multilateral structures, it is truly impressive, and I think it is an inspiration to those of us in North America but also should be an inspiration to Northeast Asia. So we would like to do some more on these things.

As I mentioned in my initial assessment, the 'Initial Actions' take the huge step of setting the stage for a permanent multilateral security dialogue for Northeast Asia. Although this dialogue won't essentially turn into a new regional security order over night (or possibly even at all), it does represent a shift away from traditional U.S. policy.

This clear signal is all the more ironic considering the second report on the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance issued by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye was also released this month. Their first report essentially advocated changing the U.S.-Japanese alliance to mirror the U.S.'s relationship with the United Kingdom. Needless to say, it was not well received by Japanese scholars or politicians. Their second report scales things back a bit and focuses on building an 'open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values.' The report also suggests turning out the alliance like a Bangkok hooker on a Saturday night in order to promote trilateral cooperation with all of the usual johns: China, India, Australia, ASEAN, APEC, etc. It also advocates using the alliance as the basis for common policy towards the tense situations on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.

I guess I have bored my non-Asia specialist readers with enough policy chatter for now. I'll make it up to you by posting something cool, I promise.

Tuesday, February 13, 2007

Blast from the Past: Latest 6-P Talks joint statement

I just read the latest joint statement agreeded to by the six parties (China, Russia, Japan, the U.S. and North and South Korea) and I almost cried. Not out of elation or sadness, but because it reminded me so much of the 1994 Agreed Framework and 1994 always makes me think about the death of Kurt Cobain. Here is a summary of today's statement:


I. The Six Parties reaffirm their intention to implementing the September 2005 joint statement in a 'step-by-step' fashion. (see this ACW post for a good description of how Joe Rood's unilateral reinterpertation of U.S. commitments in the 2005 JS caused implementation to fall apart before it even began)

II.

1) North Korea will power down and seal the graphite-moderated Magnox reactor at Yongbyon.

2) North Korea will disclose all of its nuclear activities.

3) The U.S. and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including consideration of taking Pyongyang off the state-sponsors of terror list and easing some unilateral sanctions.

4) Japan and North Korea will initiate talks to normalize relations, including North Korean grievances originating from the Japanese occupation and the status of the Japanese citizens kidnapped by the Norks back in the 70s (not explicitly stated, but definitely in the subtext).

5) Reaffirms the first three clauses of the JS issued two years ago. This includes commitments to normalizing relations all around, an affirmation that U.S. nuclear weapons are off the Korean peninsula and will not return and commitments to provide energy aid to Pyongyang.

III. The Six Parties will establish working groups on Korean denulearization, energy assistance to the North, the normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo/Washington and a East Asian 'peace and security' mechanism.

IV. The North Koreans will receive up to 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (with an initial shipment of 50,000 tons) once they declare and begin dismantling their nuclear program.

V. The Six Parties agree to future ministerial meetings to monitor implementation and explore other subjects to promote 'peace and security' in East Asia.

VI. The Six Parties will work to build mutual trust and peace in the region. Peace between the North and South will be handled in a different (probably bilateral) venue.

VII. The Six Parties will meet again on March 19th for the sixth round of talks.


The lack of a firm promise to provide North Korea with a permanent substitute for the energy generated by Yongbyon (i.e. light-water nuclear reactors) and a commitment to continue six-party consultations on larger security issues are the two major differences between today's JS and the Agreed Framework.

These changes definitely reflect the Bush administration's qualitatively different approach to security East Asia and nonproliferation. In terms of East Asia, the U.S. has chosen a position that is long on revisionist rhetoric (shaping China's rise, regime change in North Korea, etc.), but is short on similar policies. The administration's most substantial policy shift in my eyes was Bush solidifying the status quo in the Taiwan Strait back in 2003 by writing off U.S. support for a unilateral declaration of Taiwanese independence. That was a pretty big step away from revisionism for a man who declared the the U.S. will do "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself" in the opening days of his presidency.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the White House is still moving away from the 'hub-and-spoke' model of relations towards East Asia that the U.S. has used to maximize its leverage over Japan, Korea and Taiwan for the past 40 years. Converting the six-party format into a semi-permanent regional security dialogue is a critical first step towards East Asian security integration. One thing is for sure, this certainly wouldn't have been possible with a sino-phobic Rumsfeld still at the helm of the DOD.

The JS is also interesting because it toes the administration's belief that nuclear proliferators should completely abdicate their right to even peaceful, proliferation resistant nuclear technology. Previous administrations have been willing to trade light-water reactors and the Additional Protocol in exchange for dismantlement, but the White House's expandive definition of 'nuclear capability' generally foreclose that route.

This may be practical option for states with minimal nuclear know-how like Iran, but it doesn't seem very practical for North Korea considering that they (kind of) crossed the nuclear threshold last year.

This may all be a moot in few months anyways, considering each party's seeming inability to implement their side of the JS in good faith. Then again, the years I've spent studying Japan, Taiwan and China have given me a pretty cynical view of the East Asian security environment.

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Translation: CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes

This is a bit of a puff piece from today's Yomiuri on a recent development in China-Japan-Korea (CJK) relations, but I need more translation practice.

CJK leadership joint declaration demands definitive settlement to North Korean nukes
January 14, 2007

[Cebu (central Philippines)] Prime Minister Abe, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun presented a joint declaration demanding North Korea "take definitive and effective steps towards" nuclear disarmament at 1600 (Tokyo time) from their hotel in Cebu.

The declaration also contained a statement that final negotiations on the "Japan, China and Korea Investment Agreement" concerning the enlargment of investment between the three countries will begin soon.

This is the first summit between Japanese, Chinese and Korean leadership since a suspension two years ago caused by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's contraversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine.

In regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, Prime Minister stressed that "the Six Party Talks are not making substantial progress. It is important for each country to apply an appropriate amount of pressure to urge the North Koreans to make the political decision to denuclearize." President Roh explained that appropriate sanctions included a "suspension of South Korean rice and fertilizer support," while Prime Minister Wen responded that "Six Party talks was a valid process" and that "Japan, China and Korea wanted to cooperatively implement a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

In regard to the abduction issue, Prime Minister Abe stated that "it is regrettable that North Korea is not correspondingly sincere (towards resolving the issue)" and requested Chinese and Korean understanding and cooperation on the matter. Both the Chinese and Korean leaders did not immediately answer, but the joint declaration did reference the abduction issue with a statement that "emphaszied the importance of coping with concerns towards the humanity of all peoples."

The joint declaration also included (1) the establishment of mechanism to allow high-level foreign ministry consultations, (2) a pledge for greater cooperation on environmental issues, including silting and water pollution, and (3) an expression of support for United Nations reform, including reform to the UN Security Council.

The seeming benality of the meeting and joint declaration betrays how tense relations between China, Japan and Korea have been for the last few years. Between Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, some rough times over the gas fields in East China Sea and the protests sparked by Kofi Annan's suggestion that Japan should get a permanent seat on the Security Council, relations between Japan, China and Korea have been frigid. The fact that the three countries haven't had mechanisms to handle working-level diplomatic consultations should speak to how weak relations within the region have been for decades.

I guess now is as good a time as any to start a thaw, now that Shinzo Abe is in power and North Korean missile and nuclear tests have forced Japanese, Chinese and South Korean policy towards Pyongyang as close together as they have ever been.

Friday, January 5, 2007

North Korea to test again?

According to ABC News, Defense officials have pontificated that the North Korea is preparing for another nuclear test. I'm a little suspicious about this myself because as Dr. Jeffery over at ACW points out, Reuters is quoting officials from other corners of the Intelligence Community who think otherwise. I'm not a huge fan of the DIA, so I decided to so look east and see what is percolating in the Japanese press: - The Chunichi Shimbun, Nikkei News, CNN Japan, and (my preferred periodical) Yomiuri Shimbun have all picked on the story, but they all cite the original ABC News piece or 'the American media' more generally as sources. Nothing of interest to report so far. - The Yomiuri has a posted a short wire piece on the Japanese cabinet's official reaction: Second North Korean nuclear test will yield a severe response, Prime Minister tells foreign press January 5, 2007
On the night of January 5th, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe discretely responded to the BBC and Reuters internet wire service from his official residence. According to the Cabinet press office, the Prime Minister stated "(In the event of a precipitous nuclear test) Japan and the interntional community will respond by taking severe measures" in refernce to reports that North Korea is preparing to conduct a repeat of its October 2006 nuclear test. He pointed out that "North Korea is involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The understanding and cooperation of European Union and NATO members in stemming North Korean proliferation has been indispensible. The countries of the world view the kidnapping [ed. of Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s] question as a gross violation of international human rights that must be tackled.
That is pretty hum-drum stuff coming from the occasionally belicose Abe.

Tuesday, January 2, 2007

Translation: North Korea says uranium deal with Russia contigent on their support in the Six Party talks

This article from the Chunichi Shimbun is a bit old, but it is what started me on this translation idea. Jane over at the ACW originally picked up on it as it was reported on in an IHT article on the same subject. The translation is as follows: North Korea on negotiations of uranium deal with Russia: Supply is contingent on Six Party talks support December 3, 2006
North Korea made it clear on December 2nd that Russian plans to expand its enrichment industry by importing North Korean uranium ore are dependent on the condition that Russia support the North's position in the Six Party talks. Russian government sources have confirmed this to this paper. According to these same officials, Russian wants monopolistic import rights on uranium ore mined from sites at Pakchon and Sunchon, which are near the North Korean capital Pyongyang. The uranium would be enriched inside Russia with the aim of selling it for large sums of money as fuel for Russian-made nuclear power plants in China and Vietnam. Russia and North Korea have been in secret negotiations over this deal since 2002. Recently, the North Korean side has been positive about their prospects because they have tied opposition to the condition of an import monopoly on uranium ore to an understanding that Russia would advocate on their behalf at the Six Party talks in China and meet Pyongyang's desire for protection. On the one hand, the North Korean nuclear test was greated by a United Nations sanction resolution adopted in October, which affirmed steps towards an embargo on North Korean weapons of mass destruction and missile-related goods. To this end, Russia fears that the guarantees on peaceful use that are needed for imported North Korean uranium ore will be too complicated for their plans. Russia's current economic growth will continue to be fuelled by its exports of natural gas and crude oil, but its plans to expand its international influence in the nuclear fuel market by expanding its uranium enrichment industry. These problems have also occured regarding Iran's nuclear program, where Russia is supporting the construction of nuclear reactors in Bushehr that it will fuel, but it is also discretely taking up support for a UN sanctions resolution.
The last paragraph is a bit of a rush job, but I think the readers will get the picture. It definitely lines up with the fact that Russia is renationalizing its civilian nuclear industry and is working to build up its low-enriched uranium exports.